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ABSTRACT
For an organization to survive it must be able to adapt to its environment. A
military organization operates in an environment that is constantly changing. The ability
to model organizational configurations and organizational decision processes can assist
the commander in adapting to the environment and understanding how a military
organization is susceptible to Information Warfare (IW) attacks. First a commander must
understand the concepts of Information Warfare, Command and Control and the concept
of organizational decision processes and how these permit an organization to adapt to its
environment. Then the commander must determine what level of detail is necessary to
model the organizational decision processes for its environment. Next the commander
must analyze his model for configuration and decision processes. Using such
commercially available software as Organizational Consultant and VDT the commander
can identify any organizational misfits to the environment and the IW attack
susceptibilities of the organizational decision processes. In the end, this approach
demonstrates that it is feasible to model organizational configuration and organizational
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A. PURPOSE OF THE THESIS
In this thesis the author examines modeling of organizational decision processes
for the purpose of determining vulnerabilities to Information Warfare (IW). It is of
particular importance because the ability to model organizational decision processes for
susceptibilities to IW allows a commander to utilize scarce resources not only efficiently
and effectively while attacking an opponent but also assists the commander in
determining how best to utilize resources in an IW defense. If the Department of
Defense (DoD) wants to capitalize on the ability of a commander to understand both
one's own IW situation and also the opponent's IW situation, then the ability for a
commander to model and test organizational decision processes must be developed and
made available to the commander. In this thesis the author will explain the concept of
IW, the concept of command and control (C2), the concept of organizational decision
processes and how these processes permit an organization to adapt to its environment.
Then the author will briefly look at what makes a good computer model for a simulation,
how to model organizational decision processes for its environment and then how to
model the organization for IW analysis.
The purpose of this investigation is the understanding of organizational
configuration (structure) and organizational decision processes so that an assessment of
the impact ofIW on organizational performance can be made. The following three steps
will lead to this understanding:
1
• Explain the general properties of organizational configuration, how an
organization makes decisions (organizational decision properties), and how an
organization adapts to its environment,
• Determine how to model an organization in its environment, and
• Determine how to model an organization to assess vulnerabilities to IW.
B. PRELIMINARIES
1. Definitions
The Department of Defense defines IW as "actions taken to achieve information
superiority in support of national military strategy by affecting adversary information and
information systems while leveraging and protecting our information and information
systems." (OSD S-3600.1, 1996) Command and Control Warfare is defined as "the
integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), Military deception, psychological
operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction mutually
supported by intelligence to deny information to, influence, degrade or destroy adversary
command and control (C2) capabilities while protecting friendly C2 capabilities against
such actions." (CJCS, 1993) An understanding of IW and C2W is essential to
understanding how an organization is susceptible to IW attack. For further information
discussing the basics of IW and C2W, LT Shawn James' thesis, entitled Thinking
Strategically About Information-Based Conflict: Developing an Analytical Approach to
Operational Measures ofEffectiveness, is an excellent resource. (James, 1996)
2. Conventions
Organizational science is equally applicable to military and civilian organizations.
That is, there is not a special branch of organizational science for military applications.
Therefore the understanding of organizational science developed in this thesis will apply
equally to civilian and military applications alike. The example that is modeled is a Joint
Task Force (JTF) organization. The reason it is chosen is because of some unique
problems encountered by the commander of the JTF that was sent for humanitarian
operations in Bangladesh and is well documented by Sessions and Jones (1996). The
modeling technique is embodied in software, in particular the software used in this thesis,
Organizational Consultant (Burton, 1995) and Virtual Design Team (Levitt, 1996) which
is designed for the commercial sector but is applied in a military environment.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis is organized around the issues discussed earlier in Section A of this
chapter. Chapter II introduces the reader to IW and C2 Warfare and includes the goals
and elements of a C2 system and the Five Pillars of IW. Chapter HI contains the
discussion of what is meant by C2, and explains how an organization makes decisions,
different types of organizational configurations and how an organization adapts to its
environment. Chapter IV contains a brief survey of what a model should incorporate for
investigating IW issues. Chapter V contains a scenario and then uses the Organizational
Consultant software to determine the proper organizational configuration for an
organization to achieve fit with its environment. Chapter VI takes the organizational
configuration from Chapter V and uses the Virtual Design Team (VDT) software to
investigate the organization for IW vulnerabilities. Finally, Chapter VII summarizes the




As stated earlier The Department of Defense defines IW as "actions taken to
achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy by affecting
adversary information and information systems while leveraging and protecting our
information and information systems." (OSD S-3600.1, 1996) If you reduce this
definition to the essentials Information Warfare (IW) is attacking Command and Control
(C2) nodes and links that physically support the decision making process. The entire
decision making process consists of actors that are making decisions (nodes) and the
input or output of those actors is the flow of information (links). The exploitation or
protection of those nodes and links is the key to IW.
The C2 decision making process consists of the organizational configuration and
decision making processes within the organization. For an organization to survive it must
be in balance with its environment, hence it must be able to adapt to environmental
changes. To accomplish organizational configuration design involves having a situation
fit, a design parameter fit and total fit. (Burton, 1995, p. 10) Situation fit is based on the
contingency factors for organizational structure: strategy, size/ownership, technology,
environment and management preferences (i.e., the variables that relatively require a
large amount of effort to change). Design parameter fit consists of the variables that are
more easily manipulated and thus serve as excellent levers of change. These variables
fall into two categories; structural configuration and properties. Total fit requires that the
design parameter recommendations fit together internally and that they also fit the actual
situation. These three fits will be discussed at length in Chapter HI. This adaptation is
manifested in a "best fit" organizational configuration. The organizational decision
making processes are driven by uncertainty and goal consensus by the decision makers.
The way that an organizational decision process reaches a decision will be determined by
the state of knowledge of the relationship between actions taken and their outcomes and
the degree of concurrence by the decision makers about the goals or criteria for
measuring performance.
This chapter will introduce IW and the Five Pillars that support an IW defense or
that allow an IW attack. This chapter will also introduce C2W and explain what
constitutes a C2W system.
B. INFORMATION WARFARE/COMMAND AND CONTROL
WARFARE
1. Introduction
This section will define Information Warfare and C2 Warfare. It will also review
the components that comprise a C2 system and their organization and susceptibilities.
The Five Pillars of Information Warfare, which is the basis of any C2 defense or attack,
also will be defined.
2. Information Warfare/Command and Control Warfare
It is difficult to have complete consensus on how IW and C2W are defined
because the concepts are so new and there is yet no specific discipline dedicated to the
concept. But for the purposes of this thesis it is defined as "Actions taken to achieve
information superiority by affecting adversary information, information based processes,
information systems and computer-based networks while defending one's own
information, information based processes, information systems and computer-based
networks. C2 Warfare is a warfighting application of IW in military operations and is a
subset of IW." (C2 Warfare, 1996, p. 1-3) The goal of C2 Warfare is to lead to
"battlespace dominance" which is an asymmetrical flow of information between
opponents in your favor. Information is the key, to both sides, and it is affected by the
physical infrastructure.
a. Goals ofInformation Warfare/Command and Control Warfare
In its base form the goal of IW/C2W is to deny information to the enemy
while maximizing friendly flow of information, this is also known as battlespace
dominance. This is accomplished by denying information to the opponent, influence the
opponent's decisions and actions by controlling what information the your opponent
receives, and by degrading/destroying your opponent's information infrastructure.
b. Elements ofa Command and Control System
All C2 systems in their base form consist of links and nodes. These links
and nodes are comprised of personnel, equipment and procedures. Nodes are organized
into systems and some systems are across multiple nodes. At first this definition might
seem a bit obscure but that is exactly one of the challenges facing IW; that is, how
exactly do you define IW. The important point is that the C2 system is viewed as links
and nodes that can be exploited for IW purposes or that need to be defended for IW
purposes. This holistic approach allows for simple, rapid modeling and vulnerability
analysis ofa system.
c. Two Types ofNodes and Links
When examining a C2 system for exploitation or protection the initial
reaction is to examine the nodes alone. While the nodes are where the information is
processed and the decisions are made they are useless without the links. If the
information can not flow then it has the same result as that of not being processed. The
Iraqi army learned this during Desert Storm when their centralized command structure,
manifested in Saddam Hussein, was denied all communications with the battlefield.
Though the node (Saddam Hussein) was not destroyed, the links were and the result was
the Iraqi army was without command. This example highlights the importance of both
the nodes and the links and emphasizes the point that it is important to think of links as a
special type of node, a node that exhibits information flow. For the purpose of this thesis
nodes and links will be referred to as node/links because they are both susceptible to IW.
There are two types of node/links in a C2 systems, critical node/links and
vulnerable node/links. A critical node/link is one where disruption or destruction has
immediate effect on the C2. A vulnerable node/link is one where a node/link can be
attacked and be subjected to manipulation and exploitation but does not have immediate
effect upon the system. A vulnerable node/link must be susceptible there has to be some
weakness that can be exploited), accessible (it must be reachable in some way) and
feasible (the commander must be willing to sacrifice the resources necessary to exploit
the node/link) to attack to be considered vulnerable. (C2, 1996, p. 4-5)
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3. The Five Pillars of Information Warfare
a. Destruction
IW destruction is the planned physical destruction of the
opponents C2 node/links such that node/link can not function permanently
or for a given period of time. Destruction, as with other elements of C2W,
has two facets: destruction for C2-attack operations and destruction for
C2-protect operations. (C2 Warfare, 1996, p. 11-3)
b. Electronic Warfare
Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and
directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the
enemy. (C2 Warfare, 1996, p. 10-3)
There are three type of EW; electronic attack, electronic protection and
electronic warfare support. Further information about these three types of EW can be
found in C2 Warfare page 10-4.
c. Deception
Military deception is defined as those actions executed to mislead
foreign decision makers, causing them to derive and accept desired
appreciations of military capabilities, intentions, operations or other
activities that evoke foreign actions that contribute to the originators'
objectives. (C2 Warfare, 1996, p. 9-3)
The essence of deception is to mislead an opponent by manipulation,
distortion or falsification to force your opponent to act in a manner detrimental to the
their best interests. While deception is an important part of any military operation it is
important to remember that it is intended to support operations, not allow them.
d. Psychological Operations
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are planned operations
involving the use of mass media techniques and/or actions to convey
selected information and indicators to foreign audiences favorable to US
national policy objectives to influence their attitudes, emotions, motives,
objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of the foreign
government, organizations, groups and individuals. (C2 Warfare, 1996, p.
8-3)
One ofthe main arguments against PSYOP is that it is difficult to measure
the marginal return of any PSYOP mission. As will be demonstrated later in the VDT
model it is possible to measure the benefit of a PSYOP versus another attack using a
different pillar and see the relative return for the same cost of the input attack.
e. Operations Security
Operations Security (OPSEC) is defined as a process of identifying
critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant
to military operations and other activities to : identify those actions that
can be observed by adversary intelligence agencies, determine indicators
adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or
pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to
adversaries, and select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to
an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary
exploitation. (C2 Warfare, 1996, p. 7-2)
Essentially OPSEC is concerned with identifying unclassified indicators
(e.g., The North Vietnamese observing unclassified flight plans of B-52's filed in the
international air traffic control system that detailed when and where they would enter
North Vietnamese airspace) that could divulge friendly intentions.
4. The Target
The ultimate target of any IW attack is the opponent's decision making process,
hence the decision makers. But in general the attack is against the physical
infrastructure, which are any nodes or links in the C2 structure that are considered either
a critical node/link or a vulnerable node/link.
In the author's opinion the Coalition Forces during Desert Storm proved this point
remarkably. While the Iraqi decision maker, Saddam Hussein, was never a specific
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target his command and control infrastructure was and the elimination of that
infrastructure had the same consequence as the elimination of the decision maker.
C. CONCLUSION
As stated earlier node/links are the essential part of any C2W system and thus
serve as an excellent focus of attack. The challenge is how best to attack the node/links.
At first this might seem a trivial issue; elimination of the node/link and the commander
has one less thing to worry about. This is not always the case. Much like a river flowing
downstream the information will eventually find away to flow again (though it may be so
late that it will do little good). Instead the issue of attack might be how to exploit the
node/link to gain knowledge of the enemies intentions or how to alter the enemy's
information to benefit the friendly forces. This is the area that the Five Pillars of IW can
best be used. They allow an evaluation of the opponent's organization to determine the
best marginal attack (i.e., the benefits of the attack vs. the cost of the attack). In Chapter
VI the VDT software will be used to demonstrate this concept.
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III. COMMAND AND CONTROL: THE
INFORMATION WARFARE TARGET
The idea ofC2W is as old as warfare itself. Destroying the adversary's capability
to effectively command and control its forces is, and always has been a lucrative military
target. Additionally, protecting friendly C2 has historically proven to be just as important
to successful military operations. (C2, 1996, p. 1-2) While the study of C2W is a new
phenomena only recently manifesting itself as a discipline the value of C2 as a "center of
gravity" has been understood since the time of Clausewitz. The Coalition forces
identified one of the Iraqi's significant weaknesses as a rigid, top-down C2 system and
the reluctance of Iraqi commanders to exercise initiative. (DoD, 1992, p. 72)
Exploitation of the Iraqi's centralized organization enabled the Coalition forces to obtain
an asymmetrical flow of information which led to battlespace dominance. This chapter
is going to introduce concepts for understanding C2 of military organizations, including
C2 loops, C2 as organizational decision systems, C2 as organizational configuration, and
C2 as organizational-environmental adaptation.
A. THE PHENOMENON: C2 OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS
1. Introduction
This section introduces the concept of C2, the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act
(OODA) Loop, the Information Hierarchy, and how the OODA Loop and the Information
Hierarchy form a generic functional model of C2 decision making processes. It also
provides background into the drivers of organizational decision systems performance. In
this section are three figures, the OODA Loop, the Information Hierarchy, and a
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combination of the OODA Loop and the Information Hierarchy. They will illustrate that
the C2 process is cyclical in nature and how the evaluation of data is used during the
cycle.
2. Command and Control (C2)
Command, for military leaders, is having all the weapons systems, and people of
the modern military and getting them to do what the commander wants. Control is
diametrically opposed to this concept, it is getting them not to do what you don't want
them to. (Haffner and Lyon, 1996, p. 54) Command and control is an area of important
study that can produce numerous advantages to the commander that understands and
implements it well. In this section C2 is defined and its implementation by the
commander is explained
a. Basic Definition
Command and Control is a relatively new discipline that has yet to have a
universally accepted definition. About the only thing that can be agreed upon is that it is
an important area of study and that it is an area of warfare that serves as a dramatic lever
of change if used properly. These two points were learned well during Desert Storm
when the Coalition forces were able to isolate the Iraqi army in the field from their
centralized C2 structure with its apex in Baghdad. For the purpose of this thesis the
author will use the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) definition.
(1) JCS definition. The JCS definition of Command and
Control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned or attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. C2 functions are
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performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities
and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and
controlling forces and operations in accomplishment of the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)
(2) Putting the pieces together. Though the JCS definition
does explain what C2 is it still does not explain who is responsible for C2 and what is to
be accomplished by C2. Without this C2 is just another interesting buzzword that will
serve little useful purpose. The burden of C2 rests with the commander alone for C2
encompasses all military functions and operations giving them significance and
synergizing them into a meaningful whole. It brings the disparate pieces together and
allows them to achieve what they could not achieve independently.
C2 is in essence the business of the Commander because he has
the authority, both official authority and personal authority, and the responsibility. The
commander recognizes what goals need to be achieved and sees to it that appropriate
actions are taken to accomplish the mission. (Command and Control, circa. 1995, p. 21)
The goal of C2 is cohesion internal to the organization and
adaptability externally. This goal can be achieved by using an organizational design that
is adapted to its environment and has achieved a good total fit. Environmental adaptation
and the concept of fit will be discussed later.
3. Nature of CI Loops
There is a set of generic functions that needs to be performed in any C2 loop and
they have to be performed in a certain order. An elementary example is identify the
target, aim the weapon and fire. It is obvious that it would be a wasted effort to identify
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the target, fire the weapon and then aim it. Following is an explanation of the OODA










The Command and Control Process
Figure 1. OODA Loop. Source: Modeled after Figure 3 in the USMC Concept
Paper, Command and Control
a. OODA Loop
Pictured above is a figure of the C2 cyclical process known as the OODA
Loop. The OODA loop applies to any two sided conflict and is an acronym for Observe,
Orient, Decide and Act which describes the basic sequence of events in the command
and control cycle. Speed (effective speed) is important in the OODA loop for it is a
cyclical process and with every iteration the antagonist who can cycle fastest gains an
advantage.
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(1) Observe. The first step in the OODA Loop is observation.
In this step the Commander observes the situation by gathering information on opponent
forces and his own forces and the environment that operations are to be conducted in.
(2) Orient. The second step in the OODA Loop is orientation
by the commander. The commander achieves this by gathering information about the
opponent and converting it into intelligence. This will enable a commander to fuse this
knowledge with the knowledge of his own forces to make an assessment of the reality of
the area of operations (AOR). The goal of the orientation phase is to develop a cohesive
mental image of the situation.
(3) Decide. The third step in the OODA Loop is that of a
decision where the commander, based upon his observations, will make a decision that is
either an immediate reaction or a deliberate plan for future events.
(4) Act. The fourth step in the OODA Loop (but not the final
step since it is a cyclical process) is action. The commanders decision is placed into
action to include dissemination of the decision, to include ensuring proper execution of
the decision by subordinates and monitoring the results via feedback.
The feedback is very important to the cycle for it serves as part of
the Observe to start the cycle again. It is the bridge that keeps an effective cycle
continuing.
b. Information Hierarchy
The Information Hierarchy consists of data in four different phases; raw
data, processed data, knowledge and understanding. It illustrates the relative value of
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data to the commander and what actions need to be performed to the data to advance it to
a higher level in the hierarchy.
Understanding Synthesized, visualized
]
Gives greater situational meaning to
Knowledge Evaluated, integrated, correlated, analyzed
Gives some meaning to
]Processed Data Formatted, plotted, translated, correlated
{} Puts in understandableform
Raw Data Raw Signals
Figure 2. Information Hierarchy based on USMC Command and Control Paper,
p. 46
(1) Raw Data. Raw data comprises the lowest class of data in
the hierarchy to include unprocessed signals picked up by any sensor which could range
from a photograph still on the unexposed film in the camera to an intercepted electronic
message that has not been evaluated yet. This type of information has very little practical
use other than to indicate that an event ofsome sort is taking place.
(2) Processed Data. Processed data is raw data that is
"cooked" or processed into a useable form for the operators that will be evaluating the
data. While processed data does have more value than raw data it is still of little use
until it is analyzed. An example of processed data is film that is developed into pictures.
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(3) Knowledge. Knowledge is processed data that has been
analyzed and evaluated. An example of this is the processed picture that has been
analyzed.
(4) Understanding. Understanding is knowledge that has been
synthesized and applied to a given situation. An example of this is a series of processed
pictures that have been analyzed and "data fused" to produce a complete picture of the
event that is taking place.
c. Generic Functional C2 Decision Process with Information
Definitions
Below is the OODA Loop integrated with the Information Hierarchy. It
demonstrates at which points in the cyclical C2 decision process various forms of data
are used. Raw data is data gathered for the commanders attention before it is processed,
it represents namely that an event has occurred that requires his attention. The data is
processed before the commander can observe it. Orientation and knowledge take place
near simultaneously and they are based upon the processed data. Understanding takes
place before the commander makes his decision as to what action will take place. After
that action has taken place the results are evaluated and the input is raw data which














The Command and Control Process
integrated with the Information Hierarchy
Figure 3. The OODA Loop integrated with the Information Hierarchy
d. Nested Loop
In any organization there are loops occurring within loops which are
within more loops to the n* degree. These layers of loops are referred to as nested loops
and they consist of the OODA Loop-Information Hierarchy interaction detailed earlier.
An example of a nested loop would be that of a platoon which experiences it own loop in
its own encounters with the enemy. A company will have its own loop that will consist
of the loops that are being experienced by the platoons in the company and an integrative
loop at the company level. A battalion will have its own loop that will consist of the
loops that are being experienced by the companies in the battalion and its own integrative
loop and these nested loops will continue up through the entire chain of command.
The nested loops reflect the C2 process as the cyclical process that it is.
The cycle constantly repeats through the Observe, Orient, Decide and Act loop. With
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each cycle an evaluation is performed to see if the process needs to be adjusted in order
to make it a more effective process. In the author's opinion it is important that the actors
cycling through the loops farther up the "nest" be capable of a more rapid adaptation to
their environment due to the fact than not only will the loop at their level effect their
actions but also the actions of all of the actors at the lower levels, and since the cycles
will be occurring at various frequencies, the actor farther up the chain will be presented
with more data at inappropriate locations in the loop thus compressing the loop even
more. To illustrate this point take a commander who is cycling through the OODA Loop
and is currently poised to make a decision when suddenly he is given new knowledge
from one of his subordinate commanders (who is also going through their own OODA
Loops) and the commander has to make a decision; does he ignore the new knowledge
and continue on with his previous cycle or does he abbreviate his cycle to go forward to
the Orient phase thus increasing the speed of the cycle.
The actor who can cycle through the loop faster and effectively gains an
advantage with each cycle. When the actor gains an advantage asymmetrical information
flow is created (one actor is receiving more information from his opponent than the
opponent is receiving from him). This asymmetrical information flow leads to
battlespace dominance.
4. C2 as Organizational Decision Systems
The OODA Loop and the Information Hierarchy can deliver to the commander
and the commander's staff useful information but it is the function of the staff and
ultimately the commander to make the decision about what course of action needs to be
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taken. This section will introduce different organizational decision making strategies,
which are known as problem solving systems, based upon the amount of knowledge that
exists between action and outcome and the degree of consensus about the goals by the
decision makers. A problem solving system is defined as an interrelated set of decision














Figure 4. Problem Solving Systems
A problem solving system is driven by two major determinants: the state of
knowledge of the relationship between action and outcome, and the degree of consensus
about the goals or criteria forjudging performance.
The state of knowledge of the relationship between action and outcome, which is
represented by the vertical axis in Figure 4, focuses on the understanding of how to solve
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and execute a solution to the problem. Degree of consensus about the goals or criteria
forjudging performance, which is represented by the horizontal axis in Figure 4, focuses
on the problem formulation.
The "four coiners" of Figure 4 represent the problem solving systems, with
different characteristics and for convenience different names.
a. Management Science
A problem in the management science realm is characterized by a high
state of knowledge of the actions and their outcomes and a high state of goal consensus.
Since there is a high state of goal consensus it is known what to do and
since there is a high state of knowledge about what tasks need to be accomplished it is
known how to do it. This allows the pre-planing of the heuristic for assessing the
situation, for identifying the problem, for solving the problem and for implementing a
solution.
b. Garbage Can
A problem in the garbage can realm is characterized by a low state of
knowledge and low goal consensus. This type of problem is also referred to as
"organized anarchy". Since there is a low state of goal consensus it is not known what
needs to be done and since there is a low state of knowledge it is not known what tasks
need to be accomplish. It can be thought of as a search procedure to discover both what
to do and how to do it.
The garbage can organizational decision system is characterized by four
attributes:
23
1. Problematic preferences: goals, problems, alternatives and solutions are not
well defined
2. A poorly understood technology
3. Turnover of participants involved in the problem solving system
4. The existence of choice opportunities: events where problems and solutions
must be linked (e.g., budgets, contract signings and new system
authorizations)
c. Carnegie
Since the Carnegie model is characterized by a low goal consensus it is
not known what to do but since there is a high state of knowledge about the tasks that
need to be accomplished if it were known what to do it, would also be known how to do
it (i.e., the technology exists to accomplish the goals but it is not understood which goal
needs to be accomplished). The Carnegie model of organizational decision making
focuses on resolving what needs to be done - the foundation of the problem.
The Carnegie model involves a problem solving system that uses three
steps:
1. The formation of coalitions around a concept of what to do. It is necessary to
build a coalition among the decision makers in order to achieve goal
consensus.
2. Coalitions inter and intra-bargain about the proper goal thus putting the focus
on what the problem is vice what the solution is.
3. If the above process results in goal consensus then there is a switch toward the
Management Science decision process. If not the system continues to cycle
until there is a goal consensus.
d. Incremental
A problem solving system in the Incremental realm is characterized by a
low state of knowledge of the action-to-outcome relationship and high goal consensus.
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The goal is understood but not the means to accomplish that goal. The result of this
predicament is an incremental search for the solution. The search consists of a series of
smaller decisions which cumulatively produce a major decision.
There are three phases to the search; the identification phase (identifying
exactly what the problem is that needs to be resolved), the diagnosis phase (formulation
of the problem), and the development phase (solution shaping occurs). The development
phase has two modes of operation. One mode is a search for solutions within the current
repertoire of known solutions (e.g., if you have a cold the doctor might recommend a
known cold medicine to see if that would provide relief because it has worked on other
patients in the past). The other mode involves a newly designed custom solution which
happens when a search among the tried and true methods does not produce a result (e.g.,
a company would write its own software when it could not find any "Off the Shelf
software that satisfies its needs). The Incremental method tends to lead to a solution
design that is one of trial and error involving many steps and therefore an incremental
approach.
B. C2 AS ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS
1. Introduction
The first, and usually the easiest way, to describe an organization is by its
organizational configuration; simple, functional, divisional, matrix, bureaucracy and ad
hoc. An organization's configuration is the general way of how work is divided,
breaking tasks into sub-tasks and coordinating activities. In the author's opinion there
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are basically two types of configurations that will be commonly found in a military
environment; divisional and functional.
This chapter is going to examine these two organizational configurations of
interest to military organizations and how they handle tasks.
2. Divisional
A divisional configuration is characterized by organizational subunits based on a
grouping of tasks focused on mission or product to be performed or produced. An
example of a divisional configuration would be all of the AAW resources, regardless of
what weapon platform they are on in a carrier battle group would be organized as part of
the AAW division.
Divisional fit is characterized by the units being relatively autonomous and top
management is not involved in operational and tactical issues but is mainly concerned
with strategic issues.
3. Functional
An organization that is structured functionally is characterized by unit grouping
based on an internal functional specialization. This functional representation could be
something along the lines of marketing, finance and operations in a business organization
or engineering, weapons and supply in a military organization. Top management is
required to be involved in strategic decision making and also is involved, to a great
extent, in tactical issues due to the high need for coordination in a functional
organization.
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An example of a functional organization contrasted to divisional organization
would be if all of the weapons on a ship were in one unit (i.e., this is usually called the
weapons division). If the grouping were based on task, such as air defense, then the radar
operators, the missile fire control technicians and the supply personnel that handle the
missile issues would all be in the same division. In the above example it obviously
makes little sense to have a divisional grouping. There are times, however, when a
divisional grouping would make sense such as when the opponent has denied the friendly
forces the ability to communicate. If the commander has made his intentions and goals
clear to his subordinate commanders then the capability to rapidly switch to a divisional
organization, which is characterized by units being relatively autonomous, will allow the
organization to adapt to its new environment and survive. In the author's opinion an
organizational reconfiguration will also generate a different decision making strategy, for
example if your functional organization is in a "garbage can" decision making system
mode then a reorganization to divisional would most likely produce an incremental
decision making system because the number of decision makers will be decreased and
thus a goal consensus will be reached and a goal consensus with low state of technology
is an incremental decision making problem.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL ADAPTATION
1. Introduction
The goal for an organization is to be able to adapt to its environment and this is
achieved through the concept of fit. Fit is how well an organization can adapt itself to its
environment. Since an organization that is highly effective, efficient and viable at
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adaptation achieves the proper fit for its environment then fit can be used as a measure of
performance.
There are four kinds of fit involved in this adaptation; Situation Fit, Design
Parameter Fit, Contingency Fit and Total Fit. In short, Situation Fit is the circumstances
that an organization is forced to deal with in designing the proper fit for an organization.
Design Parameter Fit consists of the structural configuration and properties that an
organization can adjust to achieve a good Total Fit. Total Fit is how well the
organization has adapted to its environment. Contingency Fit is fit of the underlying
science to the design circumstances. It explains how Situation Fit and Design Parameter
Fit scientifically based and work together. It will be discussed in more detail in the next
chapter.
In this chapter the author will introduce three of the four kinds of "fit"; Situation
Fit, Design Parameter Fit and Total Fit, and discuss their characteristics and how they are
interrelated.
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Figure 5. Organizational Design Fit Modeled after Burton and Obel's Design fit
from Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design p. 10
2. Fit Criteria
In order to understand how fit can be achieved, it is best to understand first how
fit is measured. As indicated in the figure above there are three criteria that measure how
well the fit is achieved. They are; effectiveness, efficiency and viability. Effectiveness is
doing the right thing. Efficiency is doing it correctly. Viability is doing the right thing
effectively for a specified amount of time. The performance on these criteria is
determined by the situation fit and the design parameter fit.
3. Situation Fit
The situation fit is based on the contingency factors for organizational structure;
strategy, size/ownership, technology, environment and management preferences. For
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further explanation of the situation fits and Burton and Obels' text, Strategic
Organizational Diagnosis and Design, is an excellent reference.
To change any of the contingency factors requires a monumental change to take
place in the organization or in the environment and thus it is relatively more difficult to
alter the situation fit, especially in the short term. For example one of the contingency
factors for situation fit is management preferences. If the organization has a preference
for centralization then it will be relatively difficult to go to a decentralized structure.
All of the situation factors should be logically consistent, "For example an
equivocal environment and a routine technology do not fit." (Burton, p. 1 1)
If a situation misfit arises it must be handled by the organization adapting to the
misfit. Effective and efficient control of these situation misfits and exploitation of your
opponents situation misfits may be the key to organizational success. The situation
factors include: Strategy, Size/Ownership, Technology, Environment, and Management
preferences. (Burton, 1995, p. 10)
The control of situational fits and misfits may actually be the key to
organizational success. An organization will have to deal with any situational misfits that
arise and one method of dealing with them is to purposely cause a different situational
misfit to arise that the organization already understands how to deal with. Only those
organizations that manage to create the proper misfits and then resolve these will be
successful. (Burton, 1995, p. 11) These successful organizations succeed because they
have learned how to adapt to their environment.
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4. Design Parameter Fit
Design Parameter Fit are the variables that are easier to influence and thus serve
as the most useful levers to achieve total fit. They are the parameters on the right side of
the above diagram. Design parameter fit consists of two elements; structural
configuration and properties. Structural configuration includes simple, functional,
divisional, machine-bureaucracy, and matrix organizations. Properties includes
complexity and differentiation, formalization, centralization, span of control, rules,
procedures, professionalization, meetings, reports, communications, media richness, and
incentives. These are all parameters that can be adjusted with less effort than the
situation fit parameters. They are levers that are more readily available. For further
explanation of the design parameter fits and situational fits Burton and Obels' text,
Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design, pages 10-13, is an excellent reference.
a. Configuration and Environment
Configuration is contingent on the environment. As stated above for an
organization to survive it must adapt to its environment or the organization can attempt to
modify or control its environment but this is very difficult to do. Situation misfits will
arise and they must be adapted to by using one of the design parameter fit variables as a
lever or by realizing the situation misfit and accepting it as part of the environment.
5. Total Design Fit
The concept of total fit is that situation fit and design parameter fit are in
agreement. It is possible, especially in a hostile environment with high equivocality, that
total design fit is not achievable. If your situation fit is internally consistent (e.g., a large
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organization with a decentralized management preference, etc..) then there is a design
parameter fit that will produce a total fit. Total fit requires that the design
recommendations fit together internally and more important, fit the actual situation.
(Burton, 1995, p. 12)
D. CONCLUSION
This chapter serves as the basic building block to understand how an organization
is effected and influenced by its environment.
For the commander of an organization to have effective command and control the
commander of the organization is forced to observe his environment and take action
accordingly and this is accomplished through the OODA Loop and the Information
Hierarchy. The commander will be confronted with problems with varying degrees of
goal consensus and states of knowledge and these problem will have to be resolved
before any actions can be taken. For these actions to be effective the commander must
achieve an organizational structure that will be able to adapt to the environment and
achieve total fit. The environment forces the organization to attempt to achieve the
proper organizational configuration. The proper organizational configuration is
sometimes not achievable and thus the organization must perform a sensitivity analysis to
achieve the best possible configuration for the environment it is attempting to deal with
and the organization must realize that some situational misfits may exist and must be
dealt with in some manner.
The proper organizational configuration leads to the proper Command and
Control structure. A careful evaluation of the proper Command and Control structure
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will lead to the opponents "centers of gravity" which is where the "5 Pillars of IW" can
best be exploited. Desert Storm clearly demonstrated this when CENTCOM identified
the Iraqi C2 as a center of gravity. Without it Saddam Hussein would have to comply
with Coalition demands. (SECDEF, 1992, p. 72)
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IV. MODELING COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR
INFORMATION WARFARE
A. INTRODUCTION
Software designed to study organizational configuration and decision making
processes is an area that has recently experienced tremendous growth due largely to the
increased performance of the desktop computer. When choosing a software program it is
important to understand how that software works in the broad sense (i.e., what input will
trigger which events, or how they model actors and tasks to be accomplished). This
chapter will introduce the various models and how they handle configuration and
decision making processes. The chapter will also explore the desired characteristics of
configuration (design) and decision process.
The software chosen for exploring organizational configuration was
Organizational Consultant because of its well documented rule base, its user-friendly
input interface (as user-friendly as a text-based front-end can be) and it's relatively
detailed explanations of the output. Organizational Consultant is included with Burton
and Obel's text, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design . The software chosen
for exploring organizational decision making processes was Virtual Design Team (VDT)
because of its graphical user interface (GUI), which allowed easy manipulation of the
actors and tasks, and because of the sensitivity analysis that it could easily perform which
facilitated the evaluation of the impact of The Five Pillars ofIW.
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B. ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN
For IW purposes it is of interest how an organization needs to configure itself in
order to adapt to its environment and also the decision making process that an
organization will use once it has adapted to its environment. It has already been
discussed how an organization configures itself to adapt to its environment and how an
organization makes decisions, this section introduces why organizational design and
decision making processes are of interest for modeling and what features a model of
these concepts should include.
1. Configuration
Environmental adaptation is absolutely necessary for an organization to survive
thus the issue of organizational design is one of the dominant issues within the area of
organizational science. In large part this is because organizations can alter their design
and thereby adjust or adapt to the task environment (Carley, 1995, p. 42). In order to
hasten this adaptation, and thus gain an advantage over your opponent who is not
adapting as rapidly, the use of computer modeling can be very beneficial. A computer
model allows the decision makers to evaluate the marginal return of various
organizational configurations without actually spending the resources to reconfigure the
organization. Not only will the decision makers be able to evaluate their own
organization and improve it but they will also be able to evaluate the opponents
organization and expose the opponents weaknesses that would be susceptible to IW
attack.
There are numerous organizational designs that can be created and implemented
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and obviously there is no way that an organization would have the time or the resources
available to attempt all of the organizational configurations and determine which
configuration was best for their organization. As Kathleen Carley has conclusively
demonstrated there is no one best organizational design; rather, the effectiveness of an
organizational design is highly contingent on various factors such as the task, the
environment, and the training organizational members receive (Carley, 1995, p. 43).
Task, environment and training are factors that are very important to be included in a
model and to make a model truly useful theses factors must be easily adjustable. The
ease of manipulation allows for the rapid performance of sensitivity analysis.
2. Decision Processes
How best to model decision making processes is an interesting proposition. An
immediate issue is what level of detail is required to be effective; not enough detail and
the model is not really producing any concrete results, too much detail and the model will
be too slow and produce too much data to be useful to the decision makers in a highly
dynamic environment. In order for information processing models of organizations to
generate reasonable, concrete and policy relevant implications, the models need to
include at an appropriate level of detail for the model's purpose: a model of the agent(s),
a model of the task and a model of the internal structure of the organization (Carley,
1995, p.44). If a model incorporates this level of detail, it is enough to provide insight
into where information is flowing and what nodes are important and more importantly
what nodes are most susceptible to IW attack.
Also many organizational features can be represented as matrices of relations.
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These relations may be among people or agents, between resource/tasks and
people/agents, between agents and skills (Carley, 1995, p.44). Ifthe model is based upon
a matrix (or several matrices) that allows access to the matrix this will enable two very
important things; firstly it will explain the underlying rule base that the model runs on
and secondly, perhaps most importantly, if the underlying rule base is not appropriate for
the given organization and its environment the matrix can easily be manipulated A
model based on a matrix is indeed a very flexible and powerful tool.
C. SOFTWARE USED FOR MODELING
This section will discuss the software, Organizational Consultant and Virtual
Design Team software and why it was chosen for the modeling conducted in this thesis.
A software program was required that integrated the situation fit parameters with
the design parameters using the science of the contingency fit to produce a total fit. This
led to the selection of Organizational Consultant. Organizational Consultant is used to
simulate organizational configuration/design because it is state of the art software and it
provided the ability to easily adjust the characteristics of design parameter fit and thus
adapt to the current task. Task, environment and training are factors, as stated earlier, that
are very important to be included in a model which, Organizational Consultant does.
Organizational Consultant also produces an output identifying any misfits and
suggesting, if any, corrections to the configuration to eliminate the misfit. The
accommodating interface of Organizational Consultant also facilitates the performance
of sensitivity analysis.
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To model the decision making process of an organization, software was required
that had a user-friendly graphical interface and that produced quantifiable results. A
model that represented some level of detail and was based upon a matrix or matrices was
also highly desirable. The above reasons led to the selection of Virtual Design Team
(VDT) to simulate organizational decision making processes because it is state of the art
software, it includes a model ofthe agent, a model ofthe task and a model of the internal
structure of the organization and it uses an underlying matrix (that is also easily adjusted
for sensitivity analysis) to model the interaction between agents and tasks. VDT
displays its results in both the graphical form, represented by actor in-tray depth (the
amount of tasks to be accomplished by the actor at a specific time) and Gantt chart, and
numerical form in the output file. The accommodating interface of VDT allowed for




This section will discuss the Organizational Consultant software and in
general explain how it turns input into a useable output form.
Contingency Fit is the underlying organizing concept that is used to
produce the rule base that drives the Organizational Consultant Software. The
Contingency Fit criterion is based on contingency theory literature and it is utilized in a
series of "if-then" statements to reconcile Situation Fit and Design Parameter Fit. In
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essence the Contingency Fit is the "organizational science" that underlies the entire
notion of fit.
The solution to the problem of organizational design is difficult but its
solution is very valuable. For example, an organizational structure can be defined as
centralized or not, formalized or not with none, few or many departments. Even in this
simple example there are 2x2x3=12 possible designs from which to choose. This number
of choices grows nonlinearly as the number of organizational dimensions grows. (Burton,
1995, p. 321) Therefore it is impractical, if not impossible, to attempt to determine the
proper organizational configuration without the aid of the software. If the problem is a
temporal one, such as determining your opponents organizational configuration and
weaknesses rapidly enough to take advantage of them in a conflict, the problem
definitely becomes even more difficult.
The Organizational Consultant software was created in an attempt to
balance the tr^nd of current organizational theory textbooks of either being too specific
or too genera in detail to be of much assistance in designing the proper organizational
configuration. The goal of Organizational Consultant is to design an appropriate
organization that will be able to adapt and achieve a fit with its environment and allow
this design to take place in timely enough manner that it is useable.
b. Fit Criteria
Fit is an organizing concept for the creation and development of the
knowledge base (Burton, 1995, p.9). The knowledge base developed by Burton and Obel
is comprised of existing contingency theory and consists of approximately 350 if-then
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propositions used by the software in designing the proper organization.
"If-then" statements are a manifestation of the knowledge base to produce
appropriate organizational design recommendations. The utilization of the "if-then"
statements can also identify fit mismatches. For example proposition 4.5 states, "If the
organization is large and not private, then centralization should be low" or proposition
5.9 states, "If the environment is hostile then formalization should be low, organizational
complexity should be low, and centralization should be very high". As a result the
knowledge base forces the user to make compromises and design trade-offs especially if
the environment has a high degree of equivocality. An example of an environment with a
high degree of equivocality would be one where a JTF has been invited by a host country
that is normally neutral or unfriendly to the U.S. to provide humanitarian assistance due
to a major natural catastrophe. Though the host country has invited U.S. forces into the
country it is not known to the U.S. forces if the host population will be friendly to the
U.S. forces or might they become hostile.
c. Contingency Fit
Contingency fit is the underlying organizing concept that joins together
the situation fit and design parameter fit. Contingency fit, as used by the Organizational
Consultant software, represents the empirical study of contingency theory. The
contingency fit criterion has largely been achieved through careful attention to the
contingency theory literature and translation of that knowledge into appropriate if-then
statements.
Each If-then contingency proposition must be consistent with the
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contingency theory and represent the knowledge base as well as be consistent with an
information-processing argument. (Burton, 1995, p. 10)
Contingency fit is important to the performance of the organization for it
exposes the mismatches which the organization will have to manage. Interestingly
enough each contingency fit may lead to more t ;an one design recommendation and thus
the best design for the organization at the time must be decided on and the mismatches
that the design will produce must be anticipated. The anticipation of the mismatches will
allow an organization to pre-plan how they will deal with the mismatches and the
software can aid with this pre-planing. For example a JTF is sent to Southwest Asia to
deal with an Iraqi troop build up. It is a small force and has a highly centralized
management preference. The organization, using Organizational Consultant, would be
able to model how the organization configuration is going to have to change in order to
adapt to the environment. Organizational Consultant would identify that the centralized
management preference is going to generate a mismatch. The organization could then
simulate various organizational configurations to determine how best to deal with this
mismatch.
d. Structural Configuration and Properties as Levers ofChange
As stated earlier it is easier to manipulate the design parameter fit
variables as opposed to the situation fit variables. Thus, the design fit variables serve as
an excellent lever of change. A predicament arises in Organizational Consultant in that
for the questions asked by the software there are a finite set of answers that may not
correctly match the desired input. The software overcomes this limitation by the use of
42
confidence factors which allows the input to be as close as possible to one of the
software responses. Then a confidence factor is assigned to the input to correlate the
input and the software response. For each design parameter, the set of if-then
propositions that lead to a design recommendation must fit and be in balance (Burton,
1995, p. 11). Conflicting design recommendations can be generated and these must be
accommodated based on which of the recommendations is stronger. For example a large
organization may suggest a decentralized management style but management might favor
a "hands-on" management style. Certainty factor (cf) helps decide which of the two
recommendations would be more pertinent. For the purposes of this thesis a certainty
factor between 21 and 30 indicates low certainty about the if-then statement , 30 to 60
indicates a medium level of certainty about the if-then statement, and greater than 60
indicates a high level of certainty about the if-then statement.
More information can be found on the Structural Configuration and
Properties in Burton and Obel's text, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design .
2. Virtual Design Team
Where a commander knows how to configure an organization to adapt to its
environment and/or how to evaluate an opponent's configuration, it is equally important
to be able to understand an organization's information processing capability. The ability
for an organization to function properly depends on the coordination and control of its
activities. An organization processes information to coordinate and control these
activities. Organizations, including project organizations, need information flows to
function, and strive to create efficient information flows to be effective (Jin, 1 996, p. 4).
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One of the main goals of an organization is the processing of information in order
to function properly in its environment. The opponent's organization is also attempting
to process information in order to function properly, thus the goal is to execute the
OODA Loop faster and more efficiently and effectively than the opponent. The essence
of VDT is that it captures this information flow and demonstrates (by Gantt chart or In-
tray chart) where the information is not flowing effectively or effectively. This
illustration by VDT clearly demonstrates by its GUI where to exploit your opponent's
vulnerabilities or just as importantly, where to defend your own vulnerabilities. This
capability to determine visually, as opposed to having to sort through reams of text data,
enables the faster execution of the OODA Loop.
This information-processing view of organizations provides a foundation for the
VDT model. In VDT, it is possible to model design teams as information-processing
structures that are composed of tasks generating information to be processed, actors
processing and communicating information, communication tools linking actors for
communication, and an organization structure that constrains actor's information-
processing and communication behavior (Jin, 1996, p.5). This capability allows the level
of detail that Carley stated was necessary to model the decision making processes of the
organization.
There are several methods to model the decision making process and one of them
is known as the Critical Path Method (CPM). While the CPM models sequential
interdependencies through explicit representation of precedence relationships between
activities, it does not take into account reciprocal information requirements between
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concurrent activities, nor the impacts of actor interactions. The ability to model
reciprocal information requirements in the IW arena is very important because of the
numerous nested loops that occur simultaneously while the commander is attempting to
cycle through the OODA Loop faster than his opponent. At the same time, contingency
theory can provide only limited answers to these questions because of its aggregated view
of organizations and its relatively general definitions of contingency factors (Jin, 1996,
p.2). Contingency theory also tends to represent a static environment while the capability
to represent a dynamic environment is very desirable if the goal is to model information
flow in a decision making process.
VDT explicitly represents an organization's tasks, its actors, and organizational
structure. For a given task and organizational setting, VDT can generate emergent
organizational performance through simulation of micro-level actions of, and interactions
among, the actors in the organization and the information flow between them.
The work that is done in any organization on a product can be divided into two
parts: the primary production work that directly adds value to the final product and
coordination work that supports the primary production work.
The primary production work is relatively straightforward to model and
understand how it affects the organization. Any link/node that is associated with the
primary production work can be easily exploited by the "destruct pillar". The
coordination work is of particular modeling interest because it is these links/nodes that
represent the coordination work that are susceptible to exploitation by the other four
pillars of IW.
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VDT's unique ability to model these two forms of work makes it an attractive
program to attempt to understand the effects ofIW on an organization. As for the current
state of VDT, it is being commercialized by its developers and Stanford University
through a start-up company called Vite (776 Tolman Drive, Stanford, CA 94305,
Phone/fax: 415/857-0632, www.vite.com).
There are two basic requirements for a VDT task model. First, the model must
capture enough details of both work contents and activity dependencies so that both
production work and coordination work can be generated. The challenge here is how to
make the model simple, but effective, across many specific types of design projects,
remembering that a simple model will be faster to create (time is of the essence in an IW
environment) and easier to understand. The second requirement is to be able to map the
model attributes to accessible, real project data, so that the model is comparable with real
project information and that the insights generated from the model are realistic. The
ability to model real project data will lend relevance to the marginal analysis (Jin, 1996,
p.8).
In the author's opinion, task interdependencies are one of the main drivers of
uncertainty and the ability to model these task interdependencies is a crucial step in
understanding organizational decision making processes. VDT allows the modeling of
pooled, sequential and reciprocal dependencies and also the ability to coordinate the
amount and content of production work.
Another aspect of importance is the way that decision makers will divide their
attention to information that is being presented. VDT allows the modeling of actor
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attention allocation which is how an actor chooses which task to work on when it faces
alternatives. This variable adds realism to the model because it allows for events to take
up all of the actors attention or move to the "front of the actors queue" that a CPM model
would not allow.
As detailed above VDT delivers several attractive modeling attributes that are
crucial to modeling a decision making process. For further information on the
characteristics of VDT an excellent source is Yan Jin and Raymond Levitt's The Virtual
Design Team: A Computational Model ofProject Organizations, 1996.
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V. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATION IN
INFORMATION WARFARE
A. INTRODUCTION
The goal of any organization is to adapt to its environment. In order for this
adaptation to occur, the situation factors must be internally consistent (e.g., a large
organization must have a decentralized management preference, a centralized
management preference would produce a situation misfit). If the situation factors are
internally consistent then there is a set of design parameters that will produce a total fit
(whether the organization uses this set of design parameter that produce a total fit is a
different question). When total fit is achieved the organization has adapted to its
environment.
It can be very difficult for military organizations to adapt to their environment
because of the environment's hostility (i.e., constant dynamic state with severe
consequences for wrong organizational configurations) and its high equivocality. But the
ability to model an organization in these circumstances is of tremendous benefit for two
reasons. Firstly, a commander can model his/her own organization and discover what
misfits there are and also model how best to deal with these misfits. This modeling
ability costs the commander few resources (i.e., time, money, equipment or personnel)
and will allow the observation of several variations of an organizational configuration,
discovering all of their strengths and weaknesses, before choosing the proper
organizational configuration. Secondly, a commander will be able to model the
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opponent's organization and discover the opponents misfits. Once the opponent's misfits
are discovered the commander can then model what will happen to the opponent's
organization if these misfits are exploited. An example would be a large army that has a
very centralized chain of command (remember a large organization has to have a
decentralized management preference to have its situation fit internally) thus producing a
situational misfit. This situational misfit would serve as a flag to the commander that
one of The 5 Pillars of IW could be used to the commander's advantage (the one that
immediately comes to mind is the destruct pillar because as stated earlier it would deny
the enemy command and control of their forces).
In this chapter a scenario is developed and then the Organizational Consultant
software is used to examine the organization and refine it so it can be adapted to its
environment. That is, determine what misfits, if any, are in existence, and how they
should be assimilated or eliminated. The scenario is a non-combatant operation, so there
is no opponent organization to model.
B. THE SCENARIO
This scenario is based on conducting an operation similar in nature to Operation
Sea Angel, the 1991 relief effort to assist the people of Bangladesh after Cyclone 02B
swept through the country killing over 140,000 people.
The location is the tropical Pacific. A small island nation is struck by a major
earthquake destroying the capital city and most of the nation's physical infrastructure.
Torrential seasonal rainfall has complicated the situation. An embarked Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) is in the region in route to scheduled exercises. The island
50
nation's government requests assistance from the United Nations and the American
Ambassador to the United Nations convinces the President that providing assistance is a
good idea. The Commander of the MEF is designated the CJTF for the relief effort and
ordered to report to the American Ambassador on the island.
The organization is assumed to include the traditional JTF elements and two
additional entities to enable successful mission completion. The priorities for the
mission will be set by an executive council consisting of the host nation's
representatives, the American Ambassador and the CJTF. Immediately beneath this body
will be the Coordinating Council consisting of selected members of the CJTF's staff,
embassy personnel, host nation representatives and representatives of all Non-
government organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs) and other
participants. The goal is to eliminate conflicts between competing interests at the higher
levels to enable routine accomplishment of logistical, medical and communications
tasking.
The entire area of operations is assumed to be roughly circular with a radius of
less than 500 miles. The nation is mostly mountainous tropical jungles with few major
cities. There is assumed to be no conflict or strife of any type and thus no resistance will
be expected to the presence of United States forces.
C. INPUT
Organizational Consultant uses 1 1 characteristics of an organization to analyze it:
Current Configuration, Complexity, Formalization, Centralization, Size, Age/Ownership,
Diversity, Technology, Environment, Management Profiles and Strategy Factors. Current
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Configuration specifies the way an organization divides work, breaks tasks into subtasks
and the coordination of these activities. An organizational configuration can be
described as simple, functional, divisional, matrix, machine bureaucracy, professional
bureaucracy or ad hoc (Burton, 1995, p. 48). In the scenario the current configuration is
described as functional.
Complexity is a measure of the horizontal (the specialization within an
organization), vertical (the depth of the organizational hierarchy) and spatial (the
geographical dispersion of the organizations activities) differentiation. As the degree of
organizational complexity increases the need for coordination of issues and the
requirements for organizational information processing increase (Burton, 1995, p. 70). In
the scenario the complexity is characterized by six to eight vertical levels, three to five
geographical locations and a moderate number of different jobs.
Formalization is how an organization achieves standardized benavior,
coordination and control. Formalization is correlated to the amount of written rules and
procedures. The greater the amount of written rules and procedures the higher the
formalization (Burton, 1995, p. 74). In the scenario the formalization is characterized by
job descriptions being available for all employees and supervision of those job
descriptions is moderately close.
Centralization is the degree to which formal decision making authority rests with
an individual, unit or level. A measure of centralization is how much direct involvement
top mangers have in gathering and interpreting the information they use in the
organizational decision making process. The more involved top management is the
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greater the centralization (Burton, 1995, p. 75). In the scenario top management is
involved in the information gathering and interpretation of that information but top
management only directly controls less that 20% of the decisions executed.
Size is a measure of how many people work for the organization and
Organizational Consultant breaks it down into small (less than 100), medium with less
impact (101-500), medium (501-1000), large with less impact (1001-2000) and large
(greater than 2000) (Burton, 1995, p. 125). Size issues are most closely associated with
centralization issues for as size increases centralization must decrease to avoid situation
misfits. In the scenario the size is 7500 personnel.
Organizational Consultant breaks Age/Ownership into young, mature and old and
ownership as private, incorporated, public, and subsidiary which only have a minor
influence on the appropriate design (Burton, 1995, p. 359). In the scenario the age is
young and the ownership status is public.
Diversity is a measurement of the number of different products that the
organization produces, the number of markets that the organization competes in and the
number of markets in which the organization operates overseas. In the scenario the
diversity is characterized by few different products and few different markets.
Technology is the information, equipment, techniques and processes required to
transform inputs into outputs. Technology is used to describe an organization as
manufacturing, service, retail or wholesale and its production as mass production,
process production or unit production. Technology is also divided into routine (if tasks
are well defined and understood and rules are written down and followed), non-routine,
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and whether it is highly or lowly divisible (divisibility is the degree to which tasks can be
divided into smaller and relatively more independent tasks). (Burton, 1995, p. 197-198)
In the scenario the technology is described as a service organization that is customer
oriented with a routine technology that is somewhat divisible.
Organizational Consultant describes the organization as either simple or
complex, by the amount of uncertainty, by the amount of equivocality and the degree of
hostility. To understand and fit the environment requires an information-processing
capability commensurate with the uncertainty in the environment (Burton, 1995, p. 144).
In the scenario the organization is described as a complex organizational environment
with a low level of uncertainty, equivocality and hostility.
Strategy is defined in Organizational Consultant by the terms Defender,
Prospector, Analyzer and Reactor. These terms are a measurement of the capital
requirement, product innovation, process innovation, price level and organizational
concern for quality (Burton, 1995, pp. 219-220). In the scenario the strategy is
characterized as a defender strategy.
This is just a brief synopsis of how Organization Consultant characterizes an
organization. (For further explanation the author suggest the Burton text, Strategic
Organizational Diagnosis and Design, pages 87-254.)
The input to the Organizational Consultant Questions for this scenario and the
reasoning behind them can be found in Appendix A. There are several areas of interest
because they highlight the difficulty of adapting software written for civilian
organizations to military organizations. For example the question "How many different
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job titles are there" (Q:l in the complexity section). In a military organization there are
fewjob titles in the vertical dimension but horizontally there are a large number, thus it is
up to the software user to decide on the appropriate answer. Another example is the
question "Written job descriptions available for" (Q:l in the formalization section).
Every member has a written job description but due to the hostility and the equivocality
of the environment the written job description may not match the job actually being
performed. Another example is the question "How much discretion does the typical
middle manager have over personnel rewards (i.e., salary increases and promotions)". In
a military organization the middle manager can not give a salary increase or a promotion
but the middle manager can give special liberty, recommend the individual for an award
(non-monetary) or give them an excellent performance appraisal. The question is, "Are
these kinds of rewards the same as the rewards meant by the question"? It is up to the
individual Organizational Consultant to resolve issues like this and it is possible each
user will interpret the question differently.
For the research leading up to this thesis, 10 military officers were broken into
three groups and asked to run a military organization through Organizational
Consultant. On numerous questions three different inputs were used because all three
groups had interpreted the question differently. All three were modeling JTFs, yet
answers still varied. For example, one question asks "How old is the organization" (Q:l
in the Age/Ownership section) and answers varied from young to mature. "Young" was
used by one group because the JTF was formed to handle a specific mission and thus it
was only a few weeks old. Where as "mature" was used by another group because JTFs
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have been around for several decades now and the technology and issues of a JTF are
well understood. Both answers are seemingly correct but both lead to different
organizational configurations. Once again it is up to the individual Organizational
Consultant user inputting the data to reconcile the differences and decide on the best
answer.
An interesting side note is that if all of the underlying rule base were known to the
user, as well as how the selection of an answer effects the outcome, it would be easier to
understand the significance of the input. It could also shed some insight on what exactly
the writers of the software intended by their question, hence an expert would be better at
organizational configuration than a novice would be.
As mentioned in the preceding chapter Organizational Consultant allows the user
to associate a confidence factor (cf) with the input. In studying military organizational
configuration with Organizational Consultant this capability can be an asset or a liability.
The reason the author believes this is because Organizational Consultant was written for
the civilian commercial sector and as demonstrated above several of the input questions
have an ambiguous meaning when applied to military context. The alteration of a cf to a
question that is already ambiguous will only increase the amount of uncertainty with the
question and the answer applied. In the author's opinion this is currently one of the




The input and the results from Organizational Consultant can be found in
Appendix A. Of particular note is the results produced by Organizational Consultant is
that while Organizational Consultant found no organizational misfits it did find situation
misfits [there are situation misfits (cf 100)]. As stated earlier a certainty factor between
21 and 30 indicates low certainty about the if-then statement
,
30 to 60 indicates a
medium level of certainty about the if-then statement, and greater than 60 indicates a
high level of certainty about the if-then statement. Thus a cf of 100 is a very strong
statement.
The Organization has both a routine technology (e.g., tasks are well defined and
understood and control is obtained through the application of rules) and a high
requirement for product innovation (the capability to develop new products in order to
adapt to the environment). This may cause problems due to the fact that a routine
technology does not support a requirement for high product innovation because the
capability to be innovative requires that there be few written rules and procedures to
follow. When many factors in the environment affect the organization, it may make it is
difficult for a defender. Defender is a strategy term. It means the organization protects
what it does and seeks to protect its established market position. For further explanation
see Burton and Obel, pages 226 through 243 Another issue to be addressed when
adapting civilian data-based organizational design software to a military environment, is
what is market position? Therefore, the defender strategy is not appropriate for the
organization. Organizational Consultant can not determine what the proper strategy is
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thus it is a misfit that will have to be dealt with by the organization. Though
Organizational Consultant did not identify the proper strategy, it has identified the mis-
match that is being generated by the conflict between the requirement for innovation and
the routine technology. This information allows the commander to decide which ofthese
two opposing values is more important to the organization and then attempt to configure
and reconcile the organization with the move important value. For example, the JTF in
the above scenario is dealing with a humanitarian operation that involves a host nation
and several third party members. This is certainly an area where there are few rules of
procedures written down for the JTF and the environment is a highly complex one.
These factors, in the author's opinion, would lead to the conclusion that the ability to
innovate is highly prized and thus the commander should reconcile the misfit by
eliminating the routine technology represented by the rules and procedures that a JTF
would normally have to adhere to.
A limitation of the Organizational Consultant is that it considers only a static
environment. If the organization being modeled is operating in a very dynamic
environment, as this one is, in that it can go from a neutral environment to a hostile
environment rapidly, then the organization has to be able to rapidly adapt to the
environmental change. Flexibility is extremely important. Organizational Consultant
has to be applied in a "brute force" sample of the environment over time to be helpful,
that is Organizational Consultant should be used with every cycle of the OODA Loop to
compensate for its inability to view a dynamic environment.
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So far Organizational Consultant has been used as a tool to model the JTF
organization but it can also be used to model the opponents organization. By modeling
the opponent's organization it will expose any misfits that are present in their
organization. Once those misfits are identified, Organizational Consultant then can be
used to explore how much of a misfit is present by performing sensitivity analysis. For
example, greater hostility requires greater centralization of the organization. If the
opponents organization is currently described as "Q: How much direct involvement does
top management have in gathering the information they will use in making decisions? A:
Some" the program describes the organizational misfits produced by driving that answer
to little or none. This capability to perform sensitivity analysis can not be overvalued. It
allows the commander to expend few resources to examine countless organizational
configurations before choosing the correct organizational configuration for the
environment. It allows the commander to identify problems, if any, that could possibly
arise, and it allows the commander to model how best to deal with those problems if they
do arise. The relatively rapid speed of the program allows the commander to perform all
of this analysis in a dynamic environment. In short the ability to perform this sensitivity
analysis gives the commander an invaluable tool.
E. CONCLUSION
For an organization to survive and thrive in an environment it must adapt to it.
This adaptation problem is made even more challenging when the environment is
dynamic and hostile in nature. The more dynamic and hostile the environment, the less
room for error to choose the correct organizational configuration to achieve this
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adaptation. The ability to model not only the present environment but also the potential
future environments allows the commander the luxury of exploring various
organizational configurations without the burden of spending his scarce resources. This
is why it is essential that a commander be provided the tools to model his environment.
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VI. ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION PROCESS IN
INFORMATION WARFARE
A. INTRODUCTION
The organizational configuration developed in the last chapter using
Organizational Consultant is the configuration basis for studying the decision processes
and how they are modeled by VDT. The VDT software is used to determine each pillars
marginal return (i.e., the cost to conduct the attack versus the cost of the damage the
attack will produce) if an attack is performed on it. While there is no opponent in the
scenario, consider the possibility of someone deciding to perform an IW attack against
the commander's organization. To ameliorate this possibility the commander chooses to
perform a vulnerability analysis of the organization. The vulnerability analysis is
conducted by simulating an IW attack against the commander's own organization and the
impact ofthe IW attack on the decision process is measured.
B. THE SCENARIO
The scenario used was the same scenario as that used for Information Warfare
Impact on a Joint Task Force Configuration mentioned above with a slight modification.
In the scenario the environmental hostility and equivocality was described as low. The
commander has received word that a leftist rebel group has decided to take advantage of
the natural disaster and convince the illiterate population that the disaster is the fault of
the Americans and the time to overthrow the island's government has arrived. The
commander realizes that the rebels will militarily be little challenge but if the can exploit
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the IW pillars they could be a significant threat. Thus, the commander orders an IW
attack on his own organization to be modeled to determine the organizations
vulnerabilities.
C. THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH
1. Scenario Aspects for Virtual Design Team
The input for this scenario is detailed in Appendix B. It is the .opd (which is a
text file) used by the VDT software. All of the parameters can be read from the .opd file
or the file can be opened in VDT which will display a graphic representation that can
only be understood on a color monitor due to different colors representing different
actions.
ST_er>d -J_ExecuthfePrci
Comm start Comm end
Figure 6. Humanitarian organizational configuration used for VDT simulation
saved as a black and white.
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Above is a black and white reproduction of the .opd file that loses a lot of its
functionality when it is not displayed in color. The colors allow a visual representation
of interdependencies which quickly leads the viewer to the notion that "ifA fails then it
will effect B". The graphical representation of the .opd file is inserted in this thesis
mainly to illustrate the organizational configuration used in the scenario and to give an
example ofwhat Appendix B looks like when opened in VDT.
Each opd file requires that there be a beginning and an end to the project
(SExecutiveProj and FExecutiveProj) and a Project Manager (ExecutiveTeamPM).
Actors in VDT are represented by an oval. The scenario has a commander (CJTF) who is
responsible for the mission and he directly supervises the Naval Component Commander
(NCC), the Ground Component Commander (GCC), and the Air Component Commander
(ACC). The NCC directly supervises the Sea Transport Officer (STO). The GCC
directly supervises the Land Transport Officer (LTO), the Communications Officer
(CommO) and the Medical Operations Officer (MedO). The ACC directly supervises the
Air Transport Officer (AT_0).
Activities in VDT are represented by a box. The STO is responsible for the start
(STstart), continuation (STcont) and the finish (STend) of sea transport activities
(i.e., moving the troops and supplies ashore via ship). If there is an exception (remember
from above that when an exception is generated it can either be ignored, reworked or
repaired) between any of these three activities they will be handled by the ST_0 (and
how they are handled by the STO is controlled by the behavioral matrix and hence is an
adjustable variable for further sensitivity analysis).
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The LT_0 is responsible for the start (LTstart), continuation (LTcont) and the
finish (LTend) of land transport activities (i.e., moving the troops and supplies around
once they have reached the shore). The LTO will handle any exceptions that arise
between the LT activities.
The CommO is responsible for the start (Commstart), continuation
(Commcont) and the finish (Commend) of communications activities. The CommO
will handle any exceptions that arise between the Comm activities.
The MedO is responsible for the medical operations (Medops) and the ATO is
responsible for the air operations (Airops).
Notice in Figure 6. that the ST, LT, Comm, Medops and Airops are occurring
in parallel (i.e., they are occurring simultaneously). If there is an exception between
different activities that have different actors (e.g., an exception arises between STcont
and LTcont) the exception will have to be resolved in the hierarchy where the two
actors meet (in the above example that would be the task of the CJTF actor to resolve the
exception).
Figure 6, if it were in color, would show that there is a "reciprocal with"
relationship between STcont and LTcont, LTcont and Airops, LTcont and
Medops which indicates that if one part of any of these relationships is overburdened it
can shift its workload to its "reciprocal with" relationship. For example, if the STcont
becomes overburdened (e.g., the number of exceptions is so high that it can not do its
job) then it could transfer its workload to LTcont. What might cause a situation like
this to arise in the scenario is if some group were to mine the harbor then the STcont
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would have to divert assets to finding and eliminating these mines instead of moving
troops and supplies.
Figure 6, if it were in color, would show a "failure dependent" relationship
between STcont and LTcont, LTcont and Airops, and LTcont and Commcont. A
failure dependent relationship means that if the activity completely fails then the activity
that it has the failure dependent relationship with will also completely fail. So, if an
activity that has both relationships, like STcont and LTcont, it is all right as long as
one of the activities doesn't completely fail. Elaborating on the earlier example as long
as the STcont was still functioning, no matter how slowly, the task will be
accomplished. If the STcont should fail (e.g., the ships all hit mines and were
destroyed) then that would cause the LTcont to fail. And because of the other failure
dependent relationships that would cause Airops and Commcont to fail thus the entire
operation would fail.
The capability to display the information flow in a graphic manner is a highly
valued characteristic because it saves countless man-hours compared to attempting to
decipher the information flow from the .opd file. Another advantage that VDT has is
that the underlying matrix that drives VDT is the behavioral matrix which is also a text
file, and since it is a text file it is easy to understand and also easy to manipulate. The
capability to observe the behavioral matrix serves two useful purposes. Firstly, it allows
the user to view the connections between the behavioral matrix and the opd file being
created for the simulation thus allowing the software user to gain some insight as to
which variables effect which other variables. Secondly, and more importantly especially
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when adapting commercial software for military use, is the capability to easily
manipulate the behavioral matrix to reflect more closely the military environment.
VDT has the ability to define actor skill levels, task requirements and complexity
variables as low, medium or high and this facilitates the capability to perform sensitivity
analysis. The initial run of the model, the output file is shown in Appendix C, was used
for the base configuration data. Then the effects of IW operations were simulated by
raising the uncertainty of target activities from low to high and the complexity variables
from medium to high and low. The results from these IW attacks are shown in Figure 7.
2. Measures of Performance for Virtual Design Team Simulations
The ability to measure the performance of various parts of the model is extremely
important to the commander so that the identification of resources that are not being used
to their potential can be better utilized. Unfortunately, the association of concrete
numbers to a VDT simulation is such a large task that it would slow down the process to
the extent that the commander would have difficulty cycling through the OODA Loop in
a timely fashion. The strength ofVDT is that if the model is applied correctly on the first
run showing the relative duration of each activity (i.e., if one activity takes twice as long
as another one then those duration variable are altered accordingly) then when an IW
attack is conducted it will demonstrate the measurements to that same relative scale For
example, if in the scenario it was modeled that STcont took twice as long as LTcont
then any IW attack on STcont would show the same relative degree with respect to
LTcont as if the numerous hours had been invested to model the exact costs. Thus, the
same result is achieved with hours less time invested and the commander is still cycling
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through the OODA Loop in a timely manner.
3. Methods of Initiating Attacks
VDTs capability to model information flow and demonstrate where bottlenecks
occurred proves extremely useful to model IW attacks because it can clearly demonstrate
when a decision maker becomes so over burdened that information no longer flows
properly. VDT can be used to determine when the best time for the attack is (attack
timing), the best target to choose and what combinations of these two variables will
produce the most optimum results. The costs associated with the attack, both to the
commander and to the opponent, are not necessarily monetary costs, they include time
and resources available to both sides in a conflict. VDT is capable of not only modeling
time used for a project but also resources, to include financial, used for a project.
a. Attack Timing
A user equipped with VDT can determine when an attack will be most
effective, cause the greatest disruption, or whether it is worth the attempt to disrupt the
effort at all. Realizing that some targets are more valuable targets then others (i.e., their
disruption produces far greater costs to the opponent than the cost of the attack does to
the friendly forces) the capability to model all of the potential targets for their marginal
return of attack while expending few resources and completing all of this modeling in a
timely manner is a valuable asset that any commander would desire. For example, a
model could be run to determine if it produces more disruption to interrupt the sea
transport at the start (ST_start) in the middle (ST_cont) or at the end (STend).
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b. Target Type
As stated earlier the cost of the attack versus the cost to the opponent is a
vital piece of information. There is no sense in risking precious resources to attack a
node/link that the opponent rarely uses. A user equipped with VDT can determine that if
an actor is attacked what the marginal return of that attack measured in decision process
terms is and thus a commander can determine if that attack is justified. For example if
the opponent decided to expend their precious resources to thwart the operation they
could model the destruction of the STstart, LTstart and Comm_start and realize the
costs to destroy these three targets but they would also see in the model that the
elimination of the STcont with its failure dependencies would stop the entire operation,
thus the model would tell them that the optimal target is the STcont.
c. Combinations
The capability to model the adjustment of one variable is worthwhile in a
model but the capability to adjust not only the target type but also the attack timing
suddenly opens up a new realm of possibilities to the commander and the planning staff.
A user equipped with VDT can compare target type and timing attacks in various
combinations to determine the optimum use of the available resources to the commander.
This capability to model an attack in two dimensions (target type and attack timing) is a
useful capability because it allows the commander to investigate more options in less
time.
The scenario used produced a rather simplistic model in that one key
activity could be eliminated which would stop the entire mission thus there is no real
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need to model in the two dimensions. If a more complex model were being used where
there wasn't one key activity that would stop the entire project then there would be a
reason to model in two dimensions.
d. Attack Type
The commander has Five Pillars of IW to attack against his opponent and
they capability to determine the costs to attack a pillar versus the attacks costs to the
opponent is a valuable one. A user equipped with VDT can model if it is more effective
to eliminate an activity (i.e., the destruct pillar) or just to degrade it. For example, if the
opponent announced to CNN (and thus the CJTF) that they were going to specifically
attempt to take hostage all of the medical personnel (thus using the PSYOP) pillar then
the commander could respond by moving the medical personnel back out to the ships.
This movement of the medical personnel would hinder the transport of troops and
supplies thus slowing down the activities and the enemy expended no more resources
than sparing one of their personnel for a CNN interview yet they accomplished the same
as destroying one of the activities.
D. THE RESULTS
1. Introduction
The results for the original run of the model are contained in Appendix C. These
results show the calculated duration, that is if everything operates perfectly, which was
1 8057 (units are not important since the IW attacks are looking at comparisons thus the
measurement is relative) while the actual duration was 18591. The difference is caused
by the number of exceptions and how they are handled. Basically an exception can be
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handled in one of three ways, it can be ignored, it can be corrected or it can be
completely reworked. This is of interest because not only is something being done to the
work but also some actor has to make the decision as to what is done. For example, is
that decision being made by the 2nd Lieutenant on the ground where the exception is
occurring or is the 2
nd
Lieutenant communicating back to the JTF staff (or maybe even
the commander) for direction? This is a key concept. If the decision is being made right
on the spot then centralization is low and it will not effect the speed of the information
flow drastically but coordination may decrease. On the other hand if the decision is
being sent up the hierarchy, as a centralized organization would do, it not only slows
down the speed of the decision being made but it also creates some vulnerable
node/links. By no means is centralization a bad thing for an organization for as
Organizational Consultant illustrates that the greater the hostility and equivocality in an
environment the more the need for centralization to deal with that hostility and
equivocality. On the other hand, these vulnerable node/links can be exploited to the
extent that enough exceptions are generated that the centralized structure literally
becomes paralyzed because exceptions are being generated faster than they can be
handled.
2. The Specifics of the Attacks
In VDT each actor has a skill set associated with them. These skill sets are
completely definable by the user and the skill sets have an experience factor associated
with them; high, medium or low. For example the LTO has medium logistics and
management skills. Also, each activity has list of required skills, for example LTstart
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requires logistics and management skills. Each activity also has a requirement
complexity, a solution complexity and a degree of uncertainty. For example, LTstart
has a requirement complexity of medium, a solution complexity of medium and a degree
of uncertainty of medium. The IW attacks are simulated by adjusting these variables,
either decreasing the actor skill set or increasing the activity requirement complexity,
solution complexity and uncertainty.
As an example of how VDT can be used to simulate an IW attack, the
configuration was modified and a base run was conducted. After the establishment of the
base (which was calculated at 5645 units) an attack was conducted individually on
communications, PSYOP, sea transport, communications officer and the ground
component commander in the humanitarian scenario.
An IW attack on the communications, or sea transport is simulated by increasing
their requirement complexity, solution complexity and uncertainty. For example if the
opponent can mine the waters, as discussed earlier, then that would drive the requirement
and solution complexity up to high because personnel who are skilled at mine hunting
and operating in mine infested water will now be required. Certainly the uncertainty
would also increase to high if the waters are mined.
An attack on the communications officer or ground component commander is
simulated by either increasing the requirement and solution complexities or decreasing
the actor skill levels. For example ifthe opponent could take the communications officer
or the ground component commander hostage than the CJTF would have to replace them
and since the replacement would be new to the job thrust into the middle of an operation
71
then there skill set would be low.
One method of creating a PSYOP attack is generated by increasing the
uncertainty of the activities. This could be accomplished by the earlier threat of the
enemy planning to take all of the medical personnel hostage. The result, besides the
medical personnel being moved off-shore, would be to increase the uncertainty to high of
every activity because now the commander is not sure if the enemy will attempt to take
other personnel hostage.
When the models are run the actual numbers themselves are not important, what
is important is the relative comparison between the individual attacks incorporated in
each model.






Figure 7. Comparison of various IW attacks on work duration
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3. The Results of the IW Attacks
As you can see from Figure 7 the altering of the variables had a significant impact
over the base calculation. As for the relative comparison it is obvious that the most
effective attack would be the PSYOP attack when compared to the other IW attacks. To
produce this data seven simulations were required; the base simulation and then six
attack simulations. The output data, namely the total duration, was then captured in a
spreadsheet which produced the graphic comparison for the commanders decision. Once
the base configuration is established and entered into VDT (no trivial matter) it is
relatively easy to manipulate data and explore different drivers (an example of a driver
would be requirement or solution complexity) effect the duration.
The commander could ask the VDT operator to simulate different variables and
since the base configuration is already created the operator would be able to rapidly
respond to the commanders wishes. This is a useful feature because the commander can
easily use VDT every cycle of the OODA Loop. If something in the base configuration
drastically changes, for instance all ground operations are eliminated, with one click of
the mouse VDT can now represent the new configuration.
E. CONCLUSION
VDT has proven to be a tremendous advantage to modeling information flow and
decision processes in an organization. It has proven capable of identifying critical
node/links and what the advantages can potentially be if the commander decides to
exploit those node/links. It has demonstrated the value of measuring one form of IW
attack against another form, but in the author's opinion one of the most important
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benefits is not an output of VDT.
When using VDT it forces the user to clearly understand how the information is
flowing and how the decision processes are being handled in an organization.
Fundamentally the use of VDT forces a structured analysis of the workflow. This
structured analysis allows the software user to clearly understand the opponent and the
opponents organization and this insight is invaluable.
VDT also has its limitations. The learning curve for VDT is extremely steep and it
is made even more difficult by the lack of documentation. Essentially a new user must
resort to the trial and error method to learn VDT if there is no access to an experienced
user.
DT , in its current version, is also computer resource intensive. Granted, it runs
on a personal computer, but it requires at least a 586 processor operating at 120 Mhz or
greater with 32 Megabytes ofRAM to offer the performance that would be required in a
dynamic environment. As stated earlier it also requires the use of a color monitor to be
able to view the interdependencies amongst the actors and tasks. Without the capability
to understand these interdependencies VDT loses a tremendous amount of its versatility
and the versatility that it does maintain is due to the fact that the VDT operator has a
significant amount of skill using and editing the .opd file.
VDT, in its current version, is also very unstable and unforgiving. The software
tends to terminate the program with the least little input error, hence once again the need
for a highly skilled operator. And when VDT terminates the program due to an error it
seizes control of all of the computer resources forcing a complete reboot of the system to
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facilitate a recovery. VDT is unforgiving in that if it terminates a program due to an input
error it will not allow that opd file to be opened again. While this guarantees that no
single .opd file will be responsible for more than one error it does slow down the learning
process of the organization.
The author devoted a great deal oftime to installing and configuring VDT'to get it
to run properly and thus there was not the opportunity to analyze numerous models. The
limitation that this produces with this thesis is that there are no concrete results to
demonstrate that VDT is the proper software to use to model decision processes. What
has been demonstrated though is that it is indeed feasible to model decision processes





In this thesis the author examines the modeling of organizational decision
processes for determining vulnerabilities to Information Warfare (IW). In order to model
IW the commander must first understand IW and the concept of command and control.
The concept ofcommand and control includes organizational decision processes and how
the decision processes allow an organization to adapt to its environment. Environmental
adaptation is essential for an organization to survive. To understand how an organization
adapts to its environment, the commander needs to understand the notions of situation fit,
design parameter fit, how they can be altered and how they are interrelated by
contingency fit. Briefly examined are the qualities that are desirable for a computer
model to simulate and analyze organizational configurations and organizational decision
processes. The thesis then models a hypothetical organization to assess its organizational
configuration and organizational decision processes. Lastly, the organizational decision
processes that could be modeled to understand the susceptibilities to IW attack are
examined.
Having understood and accepted the importance of being able to model
organizational configurations and organizational decision processes could go a long way
in assisting the commander to understand his/her own organization and the opponent's
organization including the strengths and weaknesses of each. Unfortunately, the state-of-
the-art of computational modeling for organizational configuration and organizational
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decision processes is problematic due to the fact that it is not user friendly. There is
currently no military efforts in this direction, so there is a need to apply commercial
civilian sector software to the problem. Additionally, this application was found to be
less than satisfactory due to the fact that it was not user friendly and not stable enough of
a software platform for a "non-expert" to use and thus the commander is only slightly
better off than before. Though the state of computational modeling is less than desirable
the commander is provided the tools to understand what variables, situation fit and
design parameter fit combining properly to produce a total fit, that are necessary for an
organization to adapt to its environment. The knowledge that these tools gives the
commander allows the formation of a mentai model of what is necessary and what
variable effect what other variables.
The approaches outlined in Chapter V and VI demonstrate that it is possible to
model organizational configuration and decision systems. They illustrate that there is
some potential value to the commander in performing this modeling. However, in order
for these efforts to reach fruition, considerable resources will be required to make the
software user friendly and a stable enough platform that a non-expert can use it
efficiently.
1. Further Research
The study of organizational configuration and organizational decision processes is
growing at a remarkable rate in the mid 1990s due to the corporate need to downsize and
increase efficiency. The DoD, during this time of "rightsizing" is being tasked with
additional missions while at the same time seeing their end-strength and budgets decline.
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They are being asked to do more with less and thus they need every advantage that they
can get. The effort to model organizational configurations and decision processes can
only help an already over-tasked commander. This author has only scratched the surface
in regards to modeling organizational configurations and decision process. For further
research in this area the following recommendations are made:
• A migration of Organizational Consultant to a Windowed environment to
assist in user friendliness;
• A "militarized" version of Organizational Consultant such that it incorporates
the differences between a military organization and a civilian commercial
organization;
• The capability to diagram what input effects what output in Organizational
Consultant;
• An exploration of whether the command would be better served with the
addition of a "professional" organizational theorist on the staff instead of
relying on software to resolve the issues;
• A robust version of VDT that has been software engineered to the point that a
mistake on input will not crash the program and render the .opd file
inoperable;
• A version of VDT that has software exception handling that will not allow the
reader to perform an act that will cause an exception;
• A powerful and meaningful on-line help for the user of VDT;
• Some documentation that thoroughly discusses the behavioral matrix and its
interactions with the .opd file for VDT;
• The search for alternative software programs to VDT that exhibit the same
modeling characteristics as VDT but have none of the above short comings of
VDT.
B. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The bottom line for any organization to survive is that it must understand its
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environment and adapt to that environment. It would be useful for an overtasked and
understaffed commander to model his/her organizational configuration and
organizational decision making processes. However, at this stage of the process until the
technology is further developed and refined that prospect is more of a hope than a
promise.
The final test of any software attempting to model organizational configurations
and organizational decision processes is whether the technology would match the
expertise of a person knowledgeable about organizational theory and decision processes
making recommendations to the commander and on that the jury is still out.
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APPENDIX A: ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT
INPUT AND RESULTS
Current Configuration
1. What is the organization's current organizational configuration?
Answer: Functional. Typical missions include medical, communications, and
transportation.
Certainty Factor - 90 - The country's leader may already have a divisional
configuration in place.
Complexity
l How many different job titles are there?
Answer: Moderate number. Vertically the JTF may be small but horizontally very
large due to the large number ofjobs. For example, every ship has concurrent duties
that must be performed.
Certainty Factor - 75
2. What proportion of employees hold advanced degrees or have many years of
specialized training?
Answer: 21-50%. There is a lot of specialized training but not necessarily for the
task at hand. For example, aviators trained to fly or troops trained for combat.
Certainty Factor - 100
3. How many vertical levels separate the chief executive from those employees
working at the bottom of the organization?
Answer: 6 to 8. We are considering the top of the organization to be the "executive"
council which is comprised of the host nation representatives and the ambassador's
staff. The bottom of the organization is the platoon (Navy division) which are the
service providers.
Certainty Factor - 100.
4. What is the average number of levels for the organization?
Answer: 3 to 5. These include the executive council, the JTF, the functional
component, and the individual unit.
Certainty Factor - 100.
5. Including the main center, how many geographic locations are there where
organization members are employed?
Answer: 3 to 5. Members will primarily be at the ambassador staff center, the crisis
center, the communications center, or the airport.
Certainty Factor - 100.
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6 What is the average distance of these outlying units from the organization's main
center?
Answer: 11 to 100 miles. Average distance ofthese centers should be relatively
close because the island is fairly small and since the troops will be living aboard ship,
they cannot be much further.
Certainty Factor - 100.
7. What proportion of the organization's total work force are located at these
separate units?
Answer: less than 10%. These are the people that are not living aboard ship.
Certainty Factor - 100.
Formalization
1. Written job descriptions available for?
Answer: all employees, including senior management. Everyone in the Navy has a
job description.
Certainty Factor - 77. Factor is reduced because the job descriptions may not be for
the task at hand.
2. Where written job descriptions exist, how closely are employees supervised to
ensure compliance with standards set in the job description?
Answer: moderately close. Certain standards have close adherence, for example
crew rest for pilots. Other standards are followed loosely, for example driving a
truck.
Certainty Factor - 90.
3. How much latitude are employees allowed from standards?
Answer: moderate amount. Lower ranks are allowed small amounts of latitude but at
the Lieutenant level there are great amounts of latitude. Standard at the higher levels
is to get the job done safely.
Certainty Factor - 100.
4. What percentage of nonmanagerial employees are given written operating
instructions or procedures for their job?
Answer: 81 to 100%. Most nonmanagerial jobs have specific procedures for
operation. For example, there are written instructions for driving a truck.
Certainty Factor - 100.
5. Of those managerial employees given written instructions or procedures, to what
extent are they followed?
Answer: a great deal. The only reason for not following a written instruction or
procedure would be for safety.
Certainty Factor - 100.
6. To what extent are supervisors and middle managers free from rules,
procedures, and policies when they make decisions?
Answer: little. Supervisors are rarely free from rules, procedures, and policy.
Certainty Factor - 100.
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7 What percentage of all the rules and procedures that exist within the
organization is in writing?
Answer: 21 to 40%. Rules for flying, driving, etc. are well written but procedures for
this operation are adhoc and mostly verbal.
Certainty Factor - 100.
Centralization
l How much direct involvement does top management have in gathering the
information they will use in making decision?
Answer: Some. Top management in this case consists ofthe executive council that
includes the ambassador's staff They set priorities, such as who is participating and
at what level. Some ofthe information comes from the host nation through the
ambassador's staff.
Certainty Factor - 80. The certainty factor was reduced in this case because of the
ambiguity in the significance versus the amount of information. Not a lot of
information comes through the staff but it tends to have a higher importance.
2. To what degree does top management participate in the interpretation of the
information input?
Answer: greater than 80%. This is the job of the executive council.
Certainty Factor - 100.
3. To what degree does top management directly control execution of a decision?
Answer: to 20%. The executive council sets the priorities and marching orders.
This just sets the mission, it does not set the execution.
Certainty Factor - 100.
4 How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over establishing his
or her budget?
Answer: unknown/no answer. Middle manager would be the ground force
commander or someone at that level. This budget may be established for the
commander but in this case it may be different. The military commander is paid for
working 24 hours a day and assets are usually provided as determined by an even
higher level than our organization considers. (Congress)
Certainty Factor - 100.
5. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over determining
how his or her unit will be evaluated?
Answer: Some. The commander writes his own fitness reports and forwards awards
to his command to a higher level but the decision would happen at a higher level.
Certainty Factor - 100.
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6 How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over hiring and
firing personnel?
Answer: None. The answer to this question is more of a statement of displeasure of
one ofthe seemingly unfortunate "facts of life" in the military. The middle manager
may move people in his/her command but actual firing is very difficult. A typical
perception in the military is that if a troop does not work out, it is the fault of the
leader. In order to fire someone from the military, very gross negligence must occur.
For example, drug use. If a troop doesn't do the job well, poor evaluations result that
may or may not lead to the troop being released from active duty.
Certainty Factor - 100.
7. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over personnel
rewards (i.e., salary increases and promotions)?
Answer: Little. Salary increases are determined by advancement. Good evaluations
help in advancement but other factors influence this more (advancement exams).
Certainty Factor - 70. Factor is reduced because rewards in the military may come
in other forms that the commander can control. Such as Sailor ofthe Quarter, or
liberty passes. Are these really significant rewards?
8. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over purchasing
equipment and supplies?
Answer: Little. For the period of this operation, little can be done about changing
what is already in the system. The commander could buy from the economy but this
cannot be counted on due to the nature of the disaster.
Certainty Factor - 80%. Factor reduced because the commander may or may not be
able to purchase some things from the local economy in this situation.
9 How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over establishing a
new project of program?
Answer: None. The executive council would decide on new projects.
Certainty Factor - 70. Factor reduced because the middle manager may have new
project denial authority. This isn't establishing a new project but is eliminating a
new project. The commander could do this for various reasons, such as safety, lack
of assets, common sense, etc.
10. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over how work
exceptions are to be handled?
Answer: Some. The commander may be able to modify his/her product (service) in
order to get the job done.
Certainty Factor - 90. Factor reduced slightly because product modification may or
may not handle work exceptions.
1
.
How many employees does the organization have?
Answer: 7500. This is the best guess that includes ships, staffs, and other experts.
Certainty Factor - 60.
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Age/Ownership
l How old is the organization?
Answer: Young. The disaster just happened; therefore, by definition.
Certainty Factor - 100.
2. What kind of ownership does the organization have?
Answer: Public/State owned. The military answers to and are funded by the public.
Certainty Factor - 100.
Diversity
l Does the organization have many different products?
Answer: Few. Products are communications, transportation, and medical typically.
Certainty Factor - 100.
2. Does the organization operate in many different markets?
Answer: Few. The only customer is the host nation.
Certainty Factor - 100.
3. Does the organization operate in more than one country? If yes, is the activity
level abroad greater than 25%?
Answer: No. Host country operation only.
Certainty Factor - 100.
4. Does the organization have many different products in the foreign market?
Answer: None.
Certainty Factor - 80. Factor reduced because the applicability of this question is
not understood for this organization.
Technology
J. What is the major activity of the organization?
Answer: Service. This organization provides communication, transportation, and
medical services.
Certainty Factor - 100.
2. What kind of technology does the organization have?
Answer: Specialized customer oriented service.
Certainty Factor - 100.
3 Does the organization have a routine technology?
Answer: Yes. These missions are done all the time in combat.
Certainty Factor - 80. The missions aren't usually done in this type of situation.
4. Is the technology divisible?
Answer: Some. Medical service can be broken into immediate care, preventative
care, etc. Transportation can be land, sea, air.
Certainty Factor - 100.
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5 Does the organization have a strong or weak dominant technology?
Answer: Average.
Certainty Factor - 50. Applicability of this question to this situation is not
understood.
6 Does the organization use or plan to use an advanced information system?
Answer: Yes. The military command and control communication system is
considered advanced.
Certainty Factor - 100.
Environment
1. Is the organizational environment simple or complex?
Answer: Complex.
Certainty Factor - 80. Factor reduced due to the questionable degree of
complexity.
2. What is the level of uncertainty of the environment?
Answer: Low. Everyone understands what happened in this situation and to what
degree.
Certainty Factor - 80. Even though the environment should be unambiguous,
sometimes it may move to Moderate uncertainty.
3. Is the equivocality of the environment low or high?
Answer: Low. Everyone understands what happened in this situation and what is
happening.
Certainty Factor - 100.
4 Is the organizational environment hostile?
Answer: Low. We are the only ones that would take the job.
Certainty Factor - 100.
Management Profiles
1. Top management may prefer to make most of the decisions themselves; or they
may prefer to delegate numerous decisions to other managers (i.e., greater
preference for decentralization). What kind of decisions does top management
prefer to make?
Answer: Both general and some operational decisions. The executive council may
make some operational decisions like this NGO will do this to this extent.
Certainty Factor - 100.
2. Top management may prefer to make long-term decisions or short-time
decisions. What kind of decisions does top management prefer to make?
Answer: Short-time Decisions. This operation is limited to 30 days.
Certainty Factor - 100.
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3. Top management may prefer to use very detailed or very aggregate information
when making decisions. What level of detail of information does top
management prefer to use when making decisions?
Answer: Very aggregate. Usually a staff provides a short report to the council.
Certainty Factor - 100.
4 Top management may prefer to be proactive in its thinking, anticipate future
events and take pre-emptive action. It may be reactive; wait and see and then
act What is top management's preference on taking action?
Answer: Some proactive, some reactive.
Certainty Factor - 100.
5. Top management may be risk averse in its decision making, or it may have a
preference to assume risk. What is top management's attitude towards risk?
Answer: Risk neutral.
Certainty Factor - 100.
6. Top management may prefer to manage through ex ante motivation or ex post
control techniques. What kind of motivation and control does top management
prefer?
Answer: Combination ofmotivation and control. Sometimes the council may just
tell the commanders what to do.
Certainty Factor - 100.
Strategy Factors
1. Does the organization have a high or low capital requirement?
Answer: Medium.
Certainty Factor - 100.
2. Does the organization have high or low product innovation?
Answer: High. This is a new product for the military.
Certainty Factor - 100.
3. Does the organization have a high or low process innovation?
Answer: Low. The product will be produced in the same manner that we conduct
combat operations.
Certainty Factor - 100.
4. Does the organization have a high or low concern for quality?
Answer: High.
Certainty Factor - 100.
5 How is the organization's price level compared to its competitors?
Answer: Unknown/no answer. Doesn't apply.
Certainty Factor - 100.
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ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT <c) 1995
Version 5 . 1-E
REPORT SUMMARY
INPUT DATA SUMMARY
The description below summarizes and interprets your
answers to the questions about your organization and
its situation. It states your answers concerning the
organization's current configuration, complexity,
formalization, and centralization. Your responses to
the various questions on the contingencies of age,
technology, environment, management style, and strategy
factors are also given. The write-up below summarizes the
input data for the analysis.
The Organization has a functional configuration.
The Organization has a moderate number of different jobs.
Of the employees at The Organization 21 to 50 % have an advanced degree or
many years of special training.
The Organization has 6 to 8 verticals levels separating top management from the bottom
level of the organization.
The mean number of vertical levels is 3 to 5.
The Organization has 3 to 5 separate geographic locations.
The Organization's average distance of these separate units from the
organization's headquarters is 11 to 100 miles.
Less than 10 % of The Organization's total workforce is located at these separate units.
Job descriptions are available for all employees, including senior management.
Where written job descriptions exist, the employees are supervised moderately closely to
ensure compliance with standards set in the job description.
The employees are allowed to deviate a moderate amount from the standards
.
81 to 100 % of nonmanagerial employees are given written operating instructions or
procedures for their job.
The written instructions or procedures given are followed to a great extent.
Supervisors and middle managers are to a little extent free from rules, procedures, and
policies when they make decisions.
21 to 40 % of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization are in
writing.
Top Management is to some extent involved in gathering the information they will use in
making decisions.
Top management participates in the interpretation of more than 80 % of the information
input
.
Top management directly controls to 20 % of the decisions executed.
The typical middle manager has some discretion over how his/her unit will be evaluated.
The typical middle manager has no discretion over the hiring and firing of personnel.
The typical middle manager has little discretion over personnel rewards - (i.e., salary
increases and promotions)
The typical middle manager has little discretion over purchasing equipment and supplies.
The typical middle manager has no discretion over establishing a new project or program.
The typical middle manager has some discretion over how work exceptions are to be handled.
The Organization has 7500 employees.
The Organization's age is young.
The Organization's ownership status is public.
The Organization has few different products.
The Organization has few different markets.
The Organization only operates in one country.
The Organization has no different products in the foreign market.
The Organization's major activity is categorized as service.
The Organization has a specialized customer-oriented service technology.
The Organization has a routine technology.
The Organization's technology is somewhat divisible.
The Organization's technology dominance is average.
The Organization has either planned or already has an advanced information system.
The Organization's environment is complex.
The uncertainty of The Organization's environment is low.
The Organization's environment has a low hostility.
The equivocality of the environment is low.
Top management prefers to make resource allocations and detailed operating decisions.
Top management primarily prefers to make short-time decisions.
Top management has a preference for very aggregate information when making decisions.
Top management has a preference for some proactive actions and some reactive actions.
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Top management is risk neutral.
Top management has a preference for a combination of motivation and control.
The Organization operates in an industry with a medium capital requirement.
The Organization has a high product innovation.
The Organization has a low process innovation.
The Organization has a high concern for quality.
The Organization's price level is undetermined relative to its competitors.
THE SIZE OF THE ORGANIZATION
The size of the organization - large, medium, or
small - is based upon the number of employees, adjusted
for their level of education or technical skills.
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's size is
large (cf 60)
.
Between 21 and 50 % of the people employed by The Organization have a high level of
education. Adjustments are made to this effect.
The adjusted number of employees is greater than 2,000 and The Organization is categorized
as large.
MANAGEMENT STYLE
The level of management's microinvolvement in decision
making is the summary measure of management style.
Leaders have a low preference for microinvolvement;
managers have a high preference for microinvolvement.
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your management profile has a
medium preference for microinvolvement (cf 8 6)
.
The management of The Organization has a preference for letting some decisions be made by
other managers. This will lead toward a medium preference for microinvolvement. The
management of The Organization has a preference for taking actions on some decisions and
being reactive toward others. This will lead toward a medium preference for
microinvolvement. Management is risk neutral. This is one of the characteristics of a
manager with a medium preference for microinvolvement. Management has a preference for
using both motivation and control to coordinate the activities, which leads toward a
medium preference for microinvolvement.
THE STRATEGY OF THE ORGANIZATION
The organization's strategy is categorized as one of
either prospector, analyzer with innovation, analyzer
without innovation, defender, or reactor. These cate-
gories follow Miles and Snow's typology.
Based on your answers, the organization has been
assigned to a strategy category. This is a statement of
the current strategy; it is not an analysis of what is
the best or preferred strategy for the organization.
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's strategy is
a defender strategy (cf 69)
.
It could also be:
- an analyzer with innovation (cf 69) .
- an analyzer without innovation (cf 67)
.
The Organization has few products. It needs to defend these products well in the
marketplace. Viability depends on being successful with these limited activities. The
Organization has a routine technology. Consequently, new products for new customers are
less likely to be possible. It needs to defend its position for the technology it has or
copy well-known products or markets. With a concern for high quality a defender strategy
is a likely strategy for The Organization.
The high requirement for product innovation requires either a prospector or an analyzer
with innovation strategy. An organization with a medium capital investment is likely to
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have some capabilities rather fixed, but can also adjust. The analyzer with innovation
which seeks new opportunities but also maintains its profitable position is appropriate.
With a concern for high quality an analyzer with innovation strategy is a likely strategy
for The Organization, with top management preferring a medium level of micro involvement
top management wants some influence. This can be obtained via control over current
operations. Product innovation should be less controlled. The strategy is therefore likely
to be analyzer with innovation.
The capital requirement of The Organization is not high, which is consistent with an
analyzer without innovation strategy. With a very routine technology, new products for new
customers are not very likely, although the firm can copy a few products. Therefore,
strategy is likely to be analyzer without innovation. With a concern for high quality an
analyzer without innovation strategy is a likely strategy for The Organization.
THE ORGANIZATION'S CHARACTERISTICS
Based on your answers, the organization's complexity,
formalization, and centralization have been calculated.
This is the current organization. Later in this report,
there will be recommendations for the organization.
The current organizational complexity is medium (cf 75)
.
The current horizontal differentiation is medium (cf 75)
.
The current vertical differentiation is medium (cf 100)
The current spatial differentiation is low (cf 100)
.
The current centralization is medium (cf 70)
.
The current formalization is high (cf 77)
.
The current organization has been categorized with respect to formalization,
centralization, and complexity. The categorization is based on the input you gave and does
not take missing information into account.
SITUATION MISFITS
A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the
contingency factors of management style, size,
environment, technology, and strategy.
There are situation misfits (cf 100)
.
The Organization has both a routine technology and a high requirement for product
innovation. This may cause problems!
When many factors in the environment affect the organization, it may make it is difficult
for a defender like The Organization to protect what it does and also difficult to




Based on your answers about the organization, its
situation, and the conclusions with the greatest cer-
taity factor from the analyses above Organizational
Consultant has derived recommendations for the
organization's configuration, complexity, formalization,
and centralization. There are also recommendations for
coordination and control, the appropriate media richness
for communications, and incentives. More detailed recom-
mendations for possible changes in the current organiza-
tion are also provided.
The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be a
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functional configuration (cf 69)
.
It is certainly not:
- an adhocracy (cf -77)
.
For a large organization with only few products, the functional configuration is
recommended.
When the equivocality of The Organization's environment is not high and the organizational
complexity is not low, the configuration should be functional. A functional configuration
is usually required when the strategy is defender.
The Organization should have a structure somewhat similar to a machine-bureaucracy.
When the technology is very routine, the configuration cannot be an ad hoc configuration
because it will not be able to operate!
The recommended degree of organizational complexity is medium (cf 61) . The Organization
has a defender strategy, which generally leads towards a medium to high organizational
complexity. A defender needs cost efficiency, and that can be obtained through
specialization. Large public organizations should have medium to high organizational
complexity. When the uncertainty of The Organization's environment is low, the
organizational complexity should neither be very low nor very high so that The
Organization will be able to react quickly when the environment changes. Top management of
The Organization has a preference for a medium level of microinvolvement, which drives the
organizational complexity towards medium. Because The Organization has an advanced
xnformation system, organizational complexity can be greater than it could otherwise.
The recommended degree of formalization is high (cf 57) . When the organization is in the
service industry and it does have a routine technology, its formalization should be higher
than if it had been in the manufacturing industry. When the organization uses an advanced
information system, formalization should be high. The Organization has a defender
strategy, which generally requires a high formalization. A defender needs cost efficiency,
and that can be obtained through formalization. Large organizations should have high
formalization. Organizations with routine technology should have high formalization.
The recommended degree of centralization is medium (cf 55)
.
There is evidence against it should be:
- low (cf -18)
.
When the organization is large and has a technology that is routine, then it is very
likely that centralization should be medium. When many factors in the environment affect
the organization but only very few of these variables are known, and the values of these
known variables are known with a high degree of certainty, centralization should be
medium. Medium centralization is recommended when top management has neither a great
desire nor very little desire for microinvolvement. Because The Organization has an
advanced information system, centralization can be greater than it could otherwise.
The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is high (cf 41)
.
The recommended degree cf vertical differentiation is medium (cf 56)
The Organization's span of control should be wide (cf 40)
.
Since The Organization has a routine technology, it should have a wide span of control
.
The Organization should use media with low media richness (cf 100)
.
The information media that The Organization uses should provide a small amount of
information (cf 70)
.
The media used should also provide
- a moderate amount of information (cf 70)
.
Incentives should be based on procedures (cf 91)
.
The Organization should use planning as means for coordination and control (cf 44)
.
It should also use
- rigid rules (cf 44)
.
- rules (cf 44)
.
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- procedures (cf 44)
.
Since The Organization is not small and has a routine technology, coordination and control
should be obtained via rules and planning, and media with low richness and a small amount
of information can be used. Incentives should be based on process. With low equivocality,
low uncertainty, and high complexity in The Organization's environment, coordination and
control should be rules and procedures. A moderate amount of information must be
considered, although it need not be rich for this low uncertainty and low equivocality
environment. Incentives should be based on procedure, thus focusing on performing
activities well. Top management should use staff for detailed planning. Numerous rules are
likely to be necessary.
The members of the organization The Organization should be theory X type people (cf 55)
When the top management of The Organization has a high or medium preference for
microinvolvement, when formalization is high and when centralization is medium or high,
the members of the organization should be Theory X type people.
ORGANIZATIONAL MISFITS
Organizational misfits compares the recommended
organization with the current organization.
There are no organizational misfits (cf 100)
No organizational misfits encountered.
END
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APPENDIX B: VDT INPUT OPD FILE
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NotSpecified Amphibous Medical Electrical Flight Logistics
ExecutiveTeam_PM
AT MedO CommO LT ST ACC GCC NCC CJTF ExecutiveTeam PM
% - End of File
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APPENDIX C: VDT OUTPUT RESULTS




Project Team Matrix Strenght:
Pro j ect .WorkVolume
:
Pro j ect . DurationCalculated
:
Pro j ect . VFPinternal
:
Pro j ect .VFPexternal
Project Team Experience:


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Activity .ResponsibleActor Processing Speed:




Activity. CoordinationVolume (infoex only)
:

























Activity. NumberOfLostExceptions (not in VQ)
Activity schedule guallity ratio (actual/schedule) 1.000000
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.666667
Activity value added index ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.000000
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 1.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 1.000000
Activity non-attended comm ratio (nonatt / comm) 1.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sen) 0.301030
Activity . BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.301030
Activity. VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep) 0.301030























Activity. ResponsibleActor Processing Speed:


































Activity schedule quallity ratio (actual/schedule) 0.996597
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.423611
Activity value added index ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.000000
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 1.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 1.000000
Activity non-attended comm ratio (nonatt / comm) 1.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sch) 0.301562
Activity. BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.301030
Activity. VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep) 0.301030










































Activity. CoordinationVolume (infoex only)


























Activity schedule quallity ratio (actual/schedule) 1.000000
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.000000
Activity value added index ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.000000
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 1.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 1.000000
Activity non-attended coram ratio (nonatt / comm) 1.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sen) 0.301030
Activity. BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.301030
Activity.VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep) 0.301030








































Activity. ResponsibleActor Processing Speed: 1.000000




Activity . CoordinationVolume (infoex only):


















, NumberOfLostExceptions (not in VQ)
Activity schedule quallity ratio (actual/schedule) 1.081944
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.030423
Activity value added index ( (rwk+coor)/wk) 0.047619
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 0.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 0.500000
Activity non-attended comm ratio (nonatt / comm) 1.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sen)
Activity. BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor) /wk)
Activity. VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep)
































Activity . TaskNumber 20






Activity. CoordinationVolume (infoex only)
:












Activity. NumberOfLostExceptions (not in VQ)
Activity schedule quallity ratio (actual/schedule) 1.004792
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.004792
Activity value added index ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.000000
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 1.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 1.000000
Activity non-attended comm ratio (nonatt / comm) 0.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sch) 0.300310
Activity. BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor ) /wk) 0.301030
Activity.VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep) 0.000000

























Activity. CoordinationVolume (infoex only)
:





Final Activity. VFPinternal: 0.020000
Final Activity.VFPexternal: 0.020000
Activity. NumberOfInternalExceptions:




Activity. NumberOfLostExceptions (not in VQ)
Activity schedule quallity ratio (actual/schedule) 1.057237
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.004375
Activity value added index ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.050000
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 0.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 0.000000
Activity non-attended comm ratio (nonatt / comm) 1.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sen) 0.292569
Activity. BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.290035
Activity.VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep) 0.301030




























Activity. CoordinationVolume (infoex only)
:
Total Work: (work, rework, coord.) 11520
Activity .NumberOfCommunications:
ActivityNumberOfNonCompComms:







Activity. NumberOfLostExceptions (not in VQ)
Activity schedule quallity ratio (actual/schedule) 1.000000
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.000000
Activity value added index ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.000000
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 1.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 1.000000
Activity non-attended comm ratio (nonatt / comm) 1.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sen) 0.301030
Activity. BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor ) /wk) 0.301030
Activity.VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep) 0.301030

















Activity. CoordinationVolume (infoex only)
:












Activity. NumberOfLostExceptions (not in VQ)
Activity schedule quallity ratio (actual/schedule) 1.000000
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.000000
Activity value added index ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.000000
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 1.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 1.000000
Activity non-attended comm ratio (nonatt / coram) 1.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sen)
Activity. BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor) /wk)
Activity.VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep)















Activity. ResponsibleActor Processing Speed: 1.000000
Activity.WorkVolume (Weber Volume) 960
Activity. ReworkVolume:
Activity. CoordinationVolume (infoex only)
Total Work: (work, rework, coord.) 960
Activity. NumberOfCommunications:
ActivityNumberOfNonCompComms:
Final Activity. VFPinternal: 0.020000






Activity. NumberOfLostExceptions (not in VQ)
Activity schedule quallity ratio (actual/schedule) 1.000000
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.000000
Activity value added index ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.000000
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 1.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 1.000000
Activity non-attended comm ratio (nonatt / comm) 1.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sch) 0.301030
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Activity. BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor ) /wk) 0.301030
Activity.VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep) 0.301030















Activity. ReworkVolume: 4 80
Activity. CoordinationVolume (infoex only):




Final Activity. VFPinternal: 0.020000








Activity. NumberOfLostExceptions (not in VQ)
Activity schedule quallity ratio (actual/schedule) 1.051231
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.005525
Activity value added index ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.043478
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 0.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 0.500000
Activity non-attended comm ratio (nonatt / coram) 1.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sen) 0.293046
Activity. BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor ) /wk) 0.291485
Activity.VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep) 0.176091



























Activity. CoordinationVolume (infoex only)
Total Work: (work, rework, coord.) 960
Activity. NumberOfCommunications:
ActivityNumberOfNonCompComms:
Final Activity. VFPinternal: 0.020000







Activity. NumberOfLostExceptions (not in VQ)
Activity schedule quallity ratio (actual/schedule) 1.000000
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.000000
Activity value added index ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.000000
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 1.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 1.000000
Activity non-attended comm ratio (nonatt / comm) 1.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sen) 0.301030
Activity. BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.301030
Activity. VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep) 0.301030



























Activity. CoordinationVolume (infoex only)



























Activity schedule quallity ratio (actual/schedule) 1.000000
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.000000
Activity value added index ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.000000
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 1.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 1.000000
Activity non-attended comm ratio (nonatt / comm) 1.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sch) 0.301030
Activity. BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.301030
Activity. VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep) 0.301030













Activity. DurationPlanned (Weber Duration)



















Activity. CoordinationVolume (infoex only) :











Activity. NumberOfLostExceptions (not in VQ)
Activity schedule guallity ratio (actual/schedule) 1.000000
Activity cost quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.666667
Activity value added index ( (rwk+ccor) /wk) 0.000000
Activity coordination work ratio (comm/rwk) 1.000000
Activity ignored exception ratio (ignored / excep) 1.000000
Activity non-attended coram ratio (nonatt / comm) 1.000000
Activity. ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sen) 0.301030
Activity. BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+coor) /wk) 0.301030
Activity.VerificationQuality - L2 (ign/excep) 0.301030
Activity. CoordinationQuality - L2 (ncifx/ifx) 0.301030
Actor finalized: AT_0
Actor Processing Speed: 1.000000





Actor Processing Speed: 1.000000













Actor Processing Speed: 1.000000












Actor Processing Speed: 1.000000




Actor Processing Speed: 1.000000




Actor Processing Speed: 1.000000





Actor Processing Speed: 1.000000


















Pro j ect .ReworkVolume
:
Project. CoordinationVolume: (inf +mts +nse)






Pro j ect . NumberOfMeetings
:
Pr o j ect . NumberOfNonAttendedMeetings
:
Project.NumberOfCompletedMeetings:




Proj ect . NumberOfCompletedCommunications
:
Project. NumberOfNoise: 5
Pro j ect. NumberOfNoiseLookedAt:
Pro j ect . NumberOfInternalExceptions
:
2
Proj ect. NumberOfExternalExceptions 3
Project. NumberOfReworkedExceptions 2
Pro j ect. NumberOfCorrectedExceptions 1
Pro j ect. NumberOfIgnoredExceptions 2
Pro j ect. NumberOfLostExceptions (not in VQ)
Pro j ect. NumberOfDefaultDelegations (in ign)
Pro j ect. NumberOfDependentExceptions (in ext) 1
Project schedule quality ratio (actual/schedule) 1.029573
Project budget quality ratio (personcost/workdone) 1.023676
Project value added work index ( (rwk+coor ) /wk) 0.017200
Project coordination work ratio (coor / rwk) 0.000000
Project ignored exception ratio (ignored/excep) 0.500000
Project non-attended comm ratio (nonatt/comm) 0.500000
Project.ScheduleQuality - L2 ( (act-sch) /sen) 0.294560
Project.BudgetQuality - L2 ( (rwk+cor+ns)/wk) 0.297279
Project.VerificationQuality - L2(ign/exp) 0.176091
Project.CoordinationQuality - L2 (noatt/att) 0.176091
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